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URBANISM UNDER GOOGLE: LESSONS FROM
SIDEWALK TORONTO
Ellen P. Goodman* & Julia Powles**
Cities around the world are rapidly adopting digital technologies, data
analytics, and the trappings of “smart” infrastructure. These innovations
are touted as solutions to help rationalize services and address rising urban
challenges, whether in housing, transit, energy, law enforcement, health
care, waste management, or population flow. Promises of urban innovation
unite cities’ need for help with technology firms’ need for markets and are
rarely subject to evidentiary burdens about projected benefits (let alone
costs). For the city, being smart is about functioning better and attracting
tech plaudits. For the technology company, the smart city is a way to capture
the value of data flows—either by directly monetizing behavioral insights or
by using those insights to design or acquire services—and then realizing the
network effects and monopoly rents that have characterized information
technology platforms.
No company is more ambitious about exploring data flows and seeking to
create and dominate networks of information than Google. In October 2017,
Google affiliate Sidewalk Labs embarked on its first prototype smart city in
Toronto, Canada, through a collaboration with the public development
authority Waterfront Toronto. Together, the project partners are planning a
new kind of data-driven urban environment: “the world’s first neighborhood
built from the internet up.”1 The vision is for a neighborhood featuring stateof-the-art sustainable architecture, autonomous vehicles, sensor-based
* Professor of Law at Rutgers Law School.
** Associate Professor of Law and Technology at the University of Western Australia. The
authors wish to thank Julie Di Lorenzo, Gabriel Ferrante, Anna Kramer, Shannon Mattern,
Sean McDonald, Pamela Robinson, Molly Sauter, Mariana Valverde, and Bianca Wylie for
their generous comments. Any mistakes belong to the authors. This Article was prepared for
the Symposium entitled Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the
Reprogramming of Law, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Neuroscience and Law
Center on February 15, 2019, at Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the
Symposium, see Deborah W. Denno & Ryan Surujnath, Foreword: Rise of the Machines:
Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 381
(2019).
1. Emily Badger, Google’s Founders Wanted to Shape a City. Toronto Is Their Chance,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/upshot/taxibots-sensorsand-self-driving-shuttles-a-glimpse-at-an-internet-city-in-toronto.html
[https://perma.cc/6APB-4K7M]; see also Daniel L. Doctoroff, Reimagining Cities from the
Internet Up, MEDIUM (Nov. 30, 2016), https://medium.com/sidewalk-talk/reimagining-citiesfrom-the-internet-up-5923d6be63ba [https://perma.cc/8L6P-SFZK].
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surveillance, and data-driven “responsive” services. Much of the vision
draws from leading city planning ideas and foregrounds progressive ideals
of inclusivity and sustainability. However, for the crucial first eighteen
months of the venture, many of the most consequential features of the
Sidewalk Toronto project were hidden from view and unavailable for serious
scrutiny. On basic questions about the proposed set of innovations, the
players defied public accountability: questions about data collection, data
control, privacy, competition, and procurement. Even more basic questions
about the use of public space went unanswered: privatized services, land
ownership, infrastructure ownership, and, in all cases, the question of who
is in control. The net result is that there can be no confidence that the
Sidewalk Toronto vision is compatible with democratic processes, sustained
public governance, or the public interest. This Article analyzes the Sidewalk
Toronto project as it took shape in its first phase, prior to the release of the
Master Innovation and Development Plan, and explores three major
governance challenges posed by the imagined “city of the future”:
privatization, platformization, and domination. The significance of this case
study applies well beyond Toronto. Google and related companies are
modeling future business growth embedded in cities and using projects like
Sidewalk Toronto as test beds. What happens in Toronto is designed to be
replicated. We conclude with some lessons highlighting the precarity of civic
stewardship and public accountability when cities are confronted with
tantalizing visions of privatized urban innovation.
INTRODUCTION
On Toronto’s eastern waterfront, a mile from the city center, there is a
twelve-acre, L-shaped plot of land that would come to be known as Quayside.
The property is largely owned by Waterfront Toronto (WT), a development
corporation established in 2001 by the Government of Canada, the Province
of Ontario, and the City of Toronto to assist in the renewal of Toronto’s
waterfront.2 Quayside came to international attention on October 17, 2017,
when Sidewalk Labs—a wholly owned subsidiary of the Google
conglomerate Alphabet Inc.—became the official “innovation and funding
partner” for the site.3 As such, it was tasked with helping to “create peoplecentred neighbourhoods that achieve precedent-setting levels of
sustainability, affordability, mobility, and economic opportunity” at
Quayside and, more significantly, to potentially scale its ideas to the vastly
more substantial 880-acre eastern waterfront, which encompasses the Port
2. About Us, WATERFRONT TORONTO, https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/
Home/waterfronthome/about-us [https://perma.cc/PWM4-GKMA] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019);
Who We Are, WATERFRONT TORONTO, https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/
Home/waterfronthome/about-us/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/63XM-DMBP] (last visited
Oct. 6, 2019).
3. New District in Toronto Will Tackle the Challenges of Urban Growth, WATERFRONT
TORONTO (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/Home/
waterfronthome/newsroom/newsarchive/news/2017/october/new+district+in+toronto+will+t
ackle+the+challenges+of+urban+growth [https://perma.cc/5PPB-UG9H].
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Lands public redevelopment area adjacent to the site.4 With Sidewalk’s
involvement, the small and otherwise unremarkable patch of postindustrial
land at Quayside quickly became the centerpiece of a heated debate,
nationally and internationally, about innovation, privatization, privacy,
surveillance, control, and the future of cities and urban life.
There was a certain giddiness to the relationship between Waterfront
Toronto and Sidewalk Labs, evident not only in the proliferation of brightly
hued concept papers and public demonstrations imagining new infrastructure
for the site5 but also in the speed with which foundational agreements about
the relationship between the parties and the bounds of the project were
consummated—all outside of public view. According to Ontario’s provincial
auditor, the Board of Waterfront Toronto was given mere days to discuss and
understand the implications of the initial “Framework Agreement” with
Sidewalk, dated October 16, 2017, before being asked to approve it.6 It did
so under intense pressure, given that the prime minister, the premier, and the
mayor had all been lined up to make the announcement public only days
later.7 Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk kept this original Framework
Agreement secret, apart from the release of a short summary.8
Even Toronto city officials were kept in the dark as concerns about
ownership and governance percolated and the project attracted intense public
interest and media attention.9 It took nine-and-a-half months for the parties
to release more details in another superseding agreement, the “Plan
4. Id.
5. Molly Sauter, City Planning Heaven Sent, E-FLUX ARCHITECTURE (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/becoming-digital/248075/city-planning-heaven-sent/
[https://perma.cc/Y7P2-FWBH] (“Sidewalk Toronto is, still, a digitally-bounded project, built
out of renderings with persuasive power but no planning utility. . . . [It is] fantastic,
fantastical, and phantasmic.”).
6. 1 OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN. OF ONT., ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at 649 (2018),
http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/content/annualreports/arreports/en18/v1_315en18.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H8NC-QPEA] [hereinafter AUDITOR REPORT].
7. Id. at 691. This was not a unanimous vote, according to former board member Julie
Di Lorenzo (the chair of the Investment and Real Estate Committee). Email from Julie Di
Lorenzo to Julia Powles, Professor of Law & Tech., Univ. of W. Austl. (May 12, 2019, 6:28
PM) (on file with authors). Di Lorenzo voted in dissent, two board members were absent, and
one board member abstained. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Julie Di Lorenzo (Apr.
2019).
8. David Rider, Toronto’s High-Tech Quayside District Takes ‘Next Step’ as New Deal
Reached with Google Sister Company, STAR (July 31, 2018), https://www.thestar.com/
news/city_hall/2018/07/31/sidewalk-labs-deal-unlocks-40-million-us-for-quayside-hightech-district.html [https://perma.cc/9F2L-QTTM].
9. Brian Barth, The Fight Against Google’s Smart City, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/08/08/sidewalk-labs/
[https://perma.cc/D8WL-S77S]; see also Mariana Valverde & Alexandra Flynn, Mystery on
the Waterfront: How the “Smart City” Allure Led a Major Public Agency in Toronto into a
Reckless Deal with Big Tech, CTR. FOR FREE EXPRESSION (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2018/12/mystery-waterfront-how-smart-city-allure-led-majorpublic-agency-toronto-reckless-deal [https://perma.cc/XDY5-RZ6J] (Toronto City Councilor
Denzil Minnan-Wong was the only public official to see the Framework Agreement in his role
as Waterfront Toronto board member. He told his fellow councilors at a meeting of the
council’s executive committee in January 2018, “I know enough about the agreement that I
think you would like to know more about the agreement [before you approve anything].”).
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Development Agreement” (PDA), dated July 31, 2018.10 Yet even then, it
was unclear what this project was all about or what Sidewalk and, more
broadly, Alphabet’s business model was: real estate development,
communications infrastructure, an Android operating system for the city? It
was obvious, in the words of Ontario’s auditor general, that the project would
implicate “intellectual property; data collection, ownership, security and
privacy; legal issues; consumer protection issues; infrastructure
development; and economic development,” but Waterfront Toronto was
charging ahead before any level of government had appropriate public
policies in place on any of these matters.11
Wherever the Sidewalk Toronto project lands, and however much of the
original vision is ever actually implemented, this first stage process of publicprivate collaboration reveals how public authorities and technology firms are
presently positioned in the rush to create the “smart city.” It also signals what
happens when the audacious promises and political leverage of one of the
most powerful companies in the world clash with the efforts of a small,
expert, and determined band of citizens, journalists, and civic groups.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I is an examination of the first stage
of the Sidewalk Toronto project, from the issuance of Waterfront Toronto’s
request for proposals concerning Quayside in March 2017 to the release of
the “Master Innovation and Development Plan” in spring 2019, and focuses
on secrecy; the studied ambiguity about land, data, infrastructure; and private
ordering. The rollout of Sidewalk Toronto, in important ways, follows other
Google experiments in other cities and domains. There is the governmental
eagerness to ease Google’s entry, the allure of “patient capital” to support
high-cost investments with long-term payoffs, and the cunning of a company
with nothing to lose. Part II examines Sidewalk’s vision of a “digital layer”
interpenetrating urban life in the context of the developing notion of the “city
as platform” and analyzes the dangers of platform governance as envisioned
by Sidewalk’s proposal. This Article concludes with a summary and
observations about alternative paths.
I. THE MAKING OF SIDEWALK TORONTO
Waterfront Toronto is a provincial not-for-profit corporation, with all three
levels of government sharing equal, non-equity shares12 and a limited
10. See Plan Development Agreement Between Toronto Waterfront Revitalization
Corporation and Sidewalk Labs LLC, WATERFRONT TORONTO 33 (July 31, 2018),
https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/waterfront/73ac1c93-665b-4fb8-b19b6bfa23c2a427/PDA+July+31+Fully+Executed+%28002%29.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
[https://perma.cc/BN55-VVZE] [hereinafter PDA].
11. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 653 (“The Province lacks a policy framework
to guide the development of a mixed-use smart city such as the one being contemplated for
Quayside.”).
12. CITY OF TORONTO, WATERFRONT STRATEGIC REVIEW 10 (2015), https://
www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-81763.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
26AU-8KRX] [hereinafter WATERFRONT STRATEGIC REVIEW]; see also CITY OF TORONTO,
REVIEW OF IMAGINATION, MANUFACTURING, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY PROPERTY TAX
INCENTIVE PROGRAM 5 (2018), https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2018/ex/bgrd/
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oversight capacity, which it exercises through the ability to select board
members, only two of whom may be public officials.13 WT owns most of
the land on the twelve-acre Quayside site, with the hundreds of acres of
adjacent waterfront lands mostly owned by the City of Toronto.14
Leveraging its modest real estate interest and comparatively larger
redevelopment role, WT announced in the spring of 2017 an audacious vision
to transform Quayside into a “globally significant demonstration project that
advances a new market model for climate-positive urban developments”—
“an exemplar of best practices and breakthrough solutions of global
significance” that it saw as a “pilot environment” and “first step towards the
longer-term vision for the broader eastern waterfront revitalization.”15
Whereas WT had previously pursued incremental mixed-use developments,
it was now pivoting to an ambitious wholesale approach and seeking an
“innovation” partner as a “co-master developer” to do it.16 By this point, it
was already in discussions with Alphabet-Sidewalk, whose executives were
in conversation with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.17
A. The Beginning: From Request for Proposals to the Framework
Agreement
On March 17, 2017, WT issued its request for proposals (RFP) to identify
a firm to create a “precedent-setting waterfront community” as a “testbed for
emerging technologies, materials and processes” on Toronto’s eastern
waterfront.18 It sought a partner to create an “overall vision” and to identify
the “technologies, infrastructure, strategies, measurable outcomes and
downstream partners” necessary to ensure the delivery of a “globally
significant demonstration project” on the Quayside portion of the lands.19

backgroundfile-111606.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LT8-UUXH] [hereinafter TAX INCENTIVE
REVIEW].
13. Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 28, s. 5(2)
(Can.) (Established in 2001 as the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, WT became
known by its current name in 2007.). Id. s. 2(1).
14. Marco Chown Oved, Google’s Sidewalk Labs Plans Massive Expansion to Waterfront
Vision, STAR (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2019/02/14/googlessidewalk-labs-plans-massive-expansion-to-waterfront-vision.html [https://perma.cc/9VBKWLEX] (78 percent of the adjacent land is owned by the city, 11 percent is owned by Ontario,
and the rest is privately owned.).
15. Request for Proposals: Innovation and Funding Partner for the Quayside
Development Opportunity, QUAYSIDE 9, 14, 20 (Mar. 17, 2017), https://quaysideto.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/Waterfront-Toronto-Request-for-Proposals-March-17-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LV6U-2KBK] [hereinafter RFP].
16. Id. at 17, 30.
17. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 688–89, 706–07.
18. RFP Released Today to Find Partner for Precedent-Setting Project, WATERFRONT
TORONTO (Mar. 17, 2017), https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/Home/
waterfronthome/newsroom/newsarchive/news/2017/march/waterfront-toronto-takes-firststep-in-building-quayside [https://perma.cc/EB35-UG9Y].
19. See RFP, supra note 15, at 7–9, 14.

462

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

The RFP involved no guarantees as to volume of work and expressly
provided that the agreement would not be an exclusive one.20
Sidewalk Labs LLC describes itself as an “urban innovation firm.”21 Since
the company’s launch in June 2015,22 it has focused on the research and
development of pilot initiatives around digital connectivity and data-fueled
community development, with the most prominent being its advertisingsupported Wi-Fi kiosk gambit on the streets of New York, LinkNYC.23
Both Sidewalk and WT have roots in failed Olympic bids. Dan Doctoroff,
founding CEO of Sidewalk, headed NYC’s bid for the 2012 Olympics.24 WT
grew out of Toronto’s bid for the 2008 Olympics.25 From Doctoroff’s telling,
the entities were destined for each other: Sidewalk was searching the world
for a place to test its synthesis of digital and physical infrastructure when
Quayside—and Toronto, “probably the most diverse large city in the
world”26—came calling.27 For its part, WT was under some pressure to
accelerate redevelopment after more than a decade of slow, but steady,
progress.28 It also needed cash; with two decades of tripartite government
funding coming to an end in 2020/21, the agency’s finances were precarious
and its ongoing existence under threat.29
Part of the story in Toronto is a divergence of opinion on the track record
for waterfront redevelopment and WT’s responsibility therefor. Doctoroff
described what he viewed as a century of development failure and a hubristic
“we alone can fix it” attitude at Sidewalk.30 By contrast, defenders of public
20. Id. at 28 (“The agreement to be negotiated with the selected Proponent will not be an
exclusive contract for the provision of the described Partner Scope and Deliverables.
Waterfront Toronto may contract with others for goods and services the same as or similar to
the Partner Scope and Deliverables or may obtain such goods and services internally.”).
21. Steve Lohr, Sidewalk Labs, a Start-Up Created by Google, Has Bold Aims to Improve
City Living, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/technology/
sidewalk-labs-a-start-up-created-by-google-has-bold-aims-to-improve-city-living.html
[https://perma.cc/5WRT-2BU4].
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Aaron Shapiro, The Urban Stack: A Topology for Urban Data
Infrastructures, TECHNOSCIENZA, Feb. 2017, at 61, 66–69.
24. Shannon Mattern, Instrumental City: The View from Hudson Yards, Circa 2019,
PLACES J. (Apr. 2016), https://placesjournal.org/article/instrumental-city-new-york-hudsonyards [https://perma.cc/4F34-MY28] (“Of course, data-driven urban planning has a long
history.”).
25. Valverde & Flynn, supra note 9.
26. Stephen J. Dubner, How to Build a Smart City, FREAKONOMICS (June 6, 2018, 11:00
AM), http://freakonomics.com/podcast/dan-doctoroff/ [https://perma.cc/C8LU-S5EW].
27. Daniel L. Doctoroff, Sidewalk’s Role as an “Essential Catalyst,” MEDIUM (Oct. 17,
2018),
https://medium.com/sidewalk-talk/sidewalks-role-as-an-essential-catalystf2c672481872 [https://perma.cc/P67C-Z4SC] (“We had spent significant time searching for a
place to bring ideas . . . to life, when Waterfront Toronto issued an RFP.”).
28. See Valverde & Flynn, supra note 9.
29. WATERFRONT STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 12, at 11–13 (showing that government
contributions diminished from C$1.38 billion between 2001 and 2015 to C$123.9 million
between 2015 and 2025).
30. Media Events, Canadian Club—Dan Doctoroff, CEO, Sidewalk Labs, YOUTUBE (Apr.
16, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzPYivcQP4M [https://perma.cc/2FRCZ5F5] (“For 107 years, [the waterfront] has stubbornly resisted development.”); see also
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redevelopment identified significant strides (particularly in the commitment
of substantial public funds to flood protection and environmental
remediation) that would have been even greater absent austerity measures
that had starved urban investment over the past several decades.31
It was in this context that WT received six submissions during the
unusually short six-week period allotted for RFP responses.32 Acting
without input from city staff, WT invited three firms to continue on to the
second stage, at which point Sidewalk was selected.33 In its response,
Sidewalk proposed projects involving autonomous transit, high-rise
laminated timber buildings, and underground utility channels,34 and
Sidewalk also promised to relocate Google’s Canadian headquarters to the
waterfront.35 A year later, Ontario’s auditor general found that WT chose
Sidewalk precipitously without adequately consulting the appropriate
governmental entities.36 WT had first contacted Sidewalk about using
Quayside as a pilot on June 27, 2016, ten months prior to issuing the RFP.37
In itself, this might not be concerning as WT seems to have approached a
number of parties prior to the call. What distinguishes the Sidewalk contact
is that it might have originated higher up. Indeed, Prime Minister Trudeau
himself hinted at such a possibility, referring at the launch of Sidewalk
Toronto to the former chairman of Google, stating, “Eric [Schmidt] and I
have been talking about collaborating on this for a few years now, and seeing
it all come together is extraordinarily exciting.”38
WT and Sidewalk entered into a Framework Agreement on October 16,
2017,39 which seemed to create a limited partnership called Sidewalk
Sidewalk Labs’ Dan Doctoroff: Quayside and the Future of Cities, RBC DISRUPTERS (Jan.
17,
2018),
https://soundcloud.com/rbcdisruptors/sidewalk-labs-dan-doctoroff-on-thequayside-project [https://perma.cc/76Z8-KM6T] (Sidewalk’s approach to Toronto was
informed by a two-year research project: “Over the past 50 years . . . 150 or so attempts to
create smart cities or urban innovation districts . . . . At some level, every single one of them
has . . . failed, or never got off the ground.”).
31. See Valverde & Flynn, supra note 9.
32. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 690.
33. See TAX INCENTIVE REVIEW, supra note 12, at 8.
34. See id.; see also Peter Carr, Interview with Pamela Robinson on the Sidewalk Toronto
Waterfront Development and Smart Cities, YOUTUBE (Feb. 12, 2018), https://youtu.be/
EKLEbAbOPuU [https://perma.cc/TF8N-EYBX] (describing the document as capturing “the
greatest hits of urban planning”).
35. See Carr, supra note 34.
36. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 652 (“The scope of the project, from selfdriving vehicles to data collection, falls under multiple provincial and federal ministries and
City departments, but Waterfront Toronto did not adequately consult with any of them prior
to signing an initial agreement on October 16, 2017, and beyond.”).
37. See id. at 689, 706.
38. Sidewalk Labs, Announcing Sidewalk Toronto: Press Conference Live Stream,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 17, 2017), https://youtu.be/A_yg_BsJy_o?t=783 [https://perma.cc/WZF22E45]. It is clear from freedom of information requests that these comments were unscripted.
At the same event, Eric Schmidt said: “This is not some random activity from our perspective.
This is the culmination of, on our side, almost ten years of thinking about how technology
could improve the quality of people’s lives.” Id. at 43:33.
39. Framework Agreement, WATERFRONT TORONTO 1 (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/waterfront/035e8ad1-6ba2-46f6-8915-
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Toronto.40 WT released a four-page summary of this agreement on
November 1, 2017,41 but the parties contracted to keep the full twenty-ninepage agreement confidential, sharing it with government staff only in a
limited fashion.42 It is worth noting that both the Framework Agreement and
Plan Development Agreement refer to several other agreements that have not
been made public.43
The secrecy surrounding the Framework Agreement caused significant
public pushback, as well as criticism from public officials. A quirk of WT’s
constitution means that it is not subject to freedom of information requests
and it can make public only what it wants under a voluntary policy.44 This
meant that even a freedom of information request on the confidentiality
provision concerning the Framework Agreement was itself denied.45 So, the
Framework Agreement was left a riddle wrapped in an enigma. Such secrecy
might be unusual for a public authority, but it is not unusual for big tech and
is a particularly favored strategy of Google. As of this writing, Google is
trying to build a new city described as a Google “village” in San Jose,
California, and has entered into a nondisclosure agreement with the city as it
negotiates the land deal.46 Activists seeking details sued for more

707176baa40f/Framework+Agreement_Executed_SUPERSEDED.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
[https://perma.cc/M2QK-BTKB].
40. Sidewalk Toronto Limited Partnership is registered in British Columbia. The
“general” partner is Sidewalk WT Master Developer GP, Ltd. and its mailing address is that
of Google LLC. See Valverde & Flynn, supra note 9. There is no record of WT being a limited
partner with Sidewalk and there is reason to believe that it could not legally be one. Email
from Mariana Valverde, Professor, Univ. of Toronto, to Ellen P. Goodman (May 12, 2019,
10:04 PM) (on file with authors).
41. Innovation and Funding Partner Framework Agreement Summary of Key Terms for
Public
Disclosure,
QUAYSIDE
(Nov.
1,
2017),
https://quaysideto.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/Summary-of-Framework-Agreement-November-1-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5W2H-XN8J] [hereinafter Summary of Framework Agreement]. On the
same day, and while due diligence was still underway, the WT and Sidewalk CEOs coauthored
an opinion piece. See Daniel L. Doctoroff & Will Fleissig, Opinion, ‘The Neighbourhood of
the Future Starts with Your Ideas,’ STAR (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/opinion/
commentary/2017/11/01/the-neighbourhood-of-the-future-starts-with-your-ideas.html
[https://perma.cc/K7PB-9RJT].
42. Executive Committee Consideration on January 24, 2018, CITY TORONTO,
http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2018.EX30.9
[https://perma.cc/2ZYR-Z48A] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
43. See Framework Agreement, supra note 39, § 15 (referring to the “Initial Definitive
Documents,” including the “Development Plan Budget” and the “Land Methodology”). There
are also various references to “Implementation Agreements,” as well as to “Business and
Implementation Plans.” See id.
44. See
Accountability
Policies,
WATERFRONT
TORONTO,
http://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/waterfront/Home/waterfronthome/aboutus/accountability/policies [https://perma.cc/9KFF-XJ2Q] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
45. Bernard Rudny, Civic Tech: We Tried to Get a Copy of the Sidewalk Toronto
Agreement, TORONTOIST (Apr. 12, 2018), https://torontoist.com/2018/04/civic-tech-tried-getcopy-sidewalk-toronto-agreement-heres-happened/ [https://perma.cc/PP6J-TPMT].
46. Jennifer Wadsworth, Lawsuit Targets Secrecy Agreements Linked to Google’s
Planned San Jose Campus, SAN JOSE INSIDE (Nov. 13, 2018), http://www.sanjoseinside.com/
2018/11/13/lawsuit-targets-secrecy-agreements-linked-to-googles-planned-san-jose-campus/
[https://perma.cc/78YG-HR2R].

2019]

URBANISM UNDER GOOGLE

465

transparency.47 As in Toronto, the details of how development will happen
and what the costs and benefits will be are unknown. The San Jose City
Council went ahead and approved the sale.48
The Quayside Framework Agreement was an agreement to agree on a
detailed overall master plan—the much referenced, but minimally
elaborated, “Master Innovation and Development Plan” (MIDP).49
Ultimately, MIDP implementation would require necessary approvals and
actions from the City of Toronto, including “planning, building and
environmental approvals, right-of-way permits, road closings, real-estate
transactions, and affordable housing requirements.”50 Sidewalk agreed to
provide funding of up to C$10 million for plan development and pilot
projects prior to the achievement of certain “initial plan milestones” and
another C$40 million after.51 The Framework Agreement makes clear that
Sidewalk wears four hats: land developer, urban planner, technology
specialist, and services vendor.52 This paper does not address the land
development portion, except to note that the Framework Agreement neither
assured Sidewalk of any land development rights nor precluded them in the
future.53 There was, however, a clear connection between the land and
Sidewalk: the company’s continued involvement depended on a public
contribution of C$1.25 billion in order for WT to complete a major flood
protection project across the Port Lands, which would make the land viable
for redevelopment.54 Full flood protection was accomplished in May 2018.55
It was not clearly apparent that Sidewalk’s plan was a “real-estate play” until
many months after the release of the Framework Agreement,56 when
Sidewalk’s internal discussions were leaked to the press.57

47. Id.
48. Roland Li, San Jose Approves Google Land Deal: Police Remove Protesters as
Council Closes Chambers, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
business/article/Google-s-San-Jose-land-deal-vote-Police-remove-13443835.php
[https://perma.cc/F62Q-7HWH].
49. See generally Framework Agreement, supra note 39 (referencing MIDP throughout
the document).
50. See TAX INCENTIVE REVIEW, supra note 12, at 2.
51. Id. at 19.
52. See Framework Agreement, supra note 39, §§ 11–15 (outlining the objectives, roles,
and responsibilities).
53. See id. § 25 (“For the avoidance of doubt, [WT] shall not be obligated to transfer any
land to the Master Developer prior to the approval of the MIDP.”).
54. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 649.
55. Id. at 651.
56. Though the company retreated from this position, Dan Doctoroff was quoted in the
deal’s first coverage as saying that it “primarily is a real-estate play.” Alex Bozikovic,
Google’s Sidewalk Labs Signs Deal for ‘Smart City’ Makeover of Toronto’s Waterfront,
GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/googlesidewalk-toronto-waterfront/article36612387/ [https://perma.cc/8S8A-QWH8].
57. See infra Part I.C.
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B. Public Outrage: Between the Framework Agreement and the Plan
Development Agreement
In the nine-and-a-half-month period following the announcement of the
Sidewalk Toronto project, members of the public and public officials
expressed concerns about data, secrecy, scope, the corporate role in planning,
and the absence of public accountability. No one could figure out what
Sidewalk’s business plan was, how it would make money, how it would pay
for the ambitious innovations it proposed, and what long-term commitments
it was prepared to make to the city. Even the question of Sidewalk’s
ownership or role in managing real estate was ambiguous.
Sidewalk executed a remarkably effective public relations campaign,
heralding its hope to “bend the curve on quality of life,” particularly around
affordability and sustainability.58 A major source of public concern was that
a steward of public lands was creating public policy with, and via, a private
vendor.59 Sidewalk ran “public roundtables” as citizen engagement events
with the flavor, but not the actual accountability, of public hearings.60 Citing
this and other aspects of Sidewalk’s public relations work, which accounted
for a sizeable portion of the C$50 million the company contributed to the
project,61 the Canadian Civil Liberties Association called the whole process
one of “governance by mercenary.”62
At every stage, ambiguity, secrecy, and slipperiness have dogged the
Sidewalk Toronto project. Because Sidewalk is a Google-affiliated
company, data issues were always going to be front and center. Experts
immediately worried about surveillance.63 At first, Sidewalk handled issues
of data collection, data control, and privacy by offering up general and vague

58. See, e.g., Dubner, supra note 26.
59. Bianca Wylie, Google Is Still Planning a ‘Smart City’ in Toronto Despite Major
Privacy Concerns, VICE (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwkv9z/googleplanning-smart-city-toronto-despite-privacy-concerns
[https://perma.cc/M2AU-7HPJ]
(“Waterfront Toronto is . . . a public corporation making policy with a vendor.”).
60. Id.; see also AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 6, at 707–08.
61. Bianca Wylie, Debrief on Sidewalk Toronto Public Meeting #3—A Master Class in
Gaslighting and Arrogance, MEDIUM (Aug. 19, 2018), https://medium.com/@biancawylie/
debrief-on-sidewalk-toronto-public-meeting-3-a-master-class-in-gaslighting-and-arrogancec1c5dd918c16 [https://perma.cc/V4B5-C6V8] (The PDA budgets “more than $11 million
USD” for “communications, external affairs and engagement . . . . This program will ‘seek to
ensure support for the master innovation and development plan among key constituents in
Toronto.’ . . . The residents’ reference panel is being paid for and run by a corporation. That’s
called a focus group.” (quoting PDA, supra note 10, at 34)).
62. Governing by Mercenary, CANADIAN C.L. ASS’N (Jan. 29, 2019), https://ccla.org/
governing-by-mercenary/ [https://perma.cc/CY9K-5TC9].
63. See, e.g., Jim Balsillie, Sidewalk Toronto Has Only One Beneficiary, and It Is Not
Toronto, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/articlesidewalk-toronto-is-not-a-smart-city/ [https://perma.cc/2T24-TFH2]; Andrew Clement,
Sidewalk Labs’ Toronto Waterfront Tech Hub Must Respect Privacy, Democracy, STAR (Jan.
12, 2018), https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2018/01/12/sidewalk-labs-torontowaterfront-tech-hub-must-respect-privacy-democracy.html [https://perma.cc/T3RU-2ZGD].
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principles (e.g., privacy by design, accountability, community benefit).64 It
also made a particularly savvy hire, the former Information and Privacy
Commissioner of Ontario Ann Cavoukian, whom it had retained along with
other prominent privacy professionals to help it develop privacy and data use
policies. The summary of the Framework Agreement said that the parties
“plan to continue to develop a thoughtful ‘Privacy by Design’ policy”—a
reference to the design framework for which Cavoukian is best known, but
there were no details.65 Nothing about privacy or data appeared in the
Framework Agreement itself. It took seven months, or until May 2018,
before a high-level statement of guiding principles for data use emerged.
Somewhat ironically, given the controversy over the project’s secrecy,
principles of transparency, proactive engagement, and community trust were
chief among them.66
Lead critics swiftly connected concerns over data to concerns over
governance and to a fundamental challenge to autonomy and freedom in
urban space. Bianca Wylie, cofounder of the technology advocacy group
Tech Reset Canada, quickly became an authority, reporting comprehensively
and expertly on the spawning project.67 Testifying before the Toronto City
Council in January 2018, she argued that “the biggest issue is not privacy,
it’s governance.”68 Wylie argued that we need to think about the “data
infrastructure the way we think about critical physical infrastructure. It
cannot be proprietary.”69 Following this meeting, the executive committee
of the council referred a request to the director of the Waterfront Secretariat,
requesting that WT “[i]nvestigate the feasibility of establishing a
democratically representative residents’ advisory group with a fiduciary
responsibility to look after residents’ digital interests” and to have the goal
that “[a]ll data collection should be anonymous by default”70—two elements
that, at least before the release of the MIDP, did not further materialize.
There was a growing recognition that the initial framing of the project had
sidelined the question of first principles: should people be tracked in the
64. Our Approach to Data Privacy, SIDEWALK LABS, https://storage.googleapis.com
/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/13214336/Sidewalk-Labs-Approach-toPrivacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS78-62N8] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
65. See Summary of Framework Agreement, supra note 41, at 2.
66. Responsible Data Use Policy Framework, SIDEWALK LABS (May 1, 2018), https://
storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/13221601/
Sidewalk-Toronto-Responsible_Data_Use_Framework_V0.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GGV8EL2G].
67. See, e.g., Bianca Wylie, Smart Cities Need Smart Governance, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec.
5,
2017),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/smart-communities-need-smartgovernance/article37218398/ [https://perma.cc/6CCJ-JC5S]; see also Laura Bliss, Meet the
Jane Jacobs of the Smart Cities Age, CITYLAB (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/
life/2018/12/bianca-wylie-interview-toronto-quayside-protest-criticism/574477/
[https://perma.cc/BAH6-4J9W].
68. Bianca Wylie, My Deputation to Toronto’s Executive Committee on Sidewalk
Toronto, MEDIUM (Jan. 25, 2018), https://medium.com/@biancawylie/my-deputation-totorontos-executive-committee-on-sidewalk-toronto-jan-24-2018-ee25785bc44e
[https://perma.cc/6ZZN-HQXE].
69. Id.
70. See Executive Committee Consideration on January 24, 2018, supra note 42.
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public realm in the first place, and who should benefit? As Wylie put it,
“[w]hen did we as a society say that however we move around in public
space—that this is something we want to share and commodify?”71
A second aspect of studied ambiguity in the rollout of Sidewalk Toronto
was the most basic issue of scope: the categorical difference between the
twelve-acre Quayside plot and the 880-acre eastern waterfront,
encompassing the Port Lands and surrounding area. In its RFP, WT scoped
the project to the Quayside site but also framed the project as a pilot for
revitalization of the broader eastern waterfront.72 The summary of the
Framework Agreement stated that both Quayside and the eastern waterfront
would be included in planning for the MIDP.73 A report prepared for the city
council, by contrast, stated confidently that the MIDP “will address the 12acre Quayside site” and that “[i]t is premature for City Council to be making
decisions about implementation related to the redevelopment of the Port
Lands.”74 The apparent tension between the summary document and the
city’s position created confusion; well into the project, “senior city officials
were still expressing concerns” that WT was working with Sidewalk on the
Port Lands when the officials thought the scope should be more limited.75
The ambiguity about land fed an anxiety that public assets were being sold
short on the promises of a gleaming new city of the future.76 Sidewalk’s
investment of US$50 million began to look a little less generous once the
public had invested C$1.25 billion to ready the Port Lands for
development.77 WT’s own limited financing at the time of the RFP award
and its need to secure ongoing funds made Sidewalk’s contribution seem
larger than it was in comparison to what the public was contributing.
71. Chris Rattan, Torontonians Should Take Control of Their Data, NOW TORONTO (May
23, 2018, 5:29 PM), https://nowtoronto.com/news/owns-data-toronto-smart-city/ [https://
perma.cc/L7A7-JE39].
72. See RFP, supra note 15, at 6 (“[I]t may be beneficial to advance the solutions,
processes and partnerships proven successful through the Project to subsequent developments
on the eastern waterfront.”); see also Summary of Framework Agreement, supra note 41, at 4
(including visualizations).
73. See Summary of Framework Agreement, supra note 41, at 1.
74. See TAX INCENTIVE REVIEW, supra note 12, at 2.
75. Jeff Gray & Josh O’Kane, Waterfront Toronto, Sidewalk Labs Walk Back Plans in
New Deal, GLOBE & MAIL (July 31, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
canada/toronto/article-new-deal-between-waterfront-toronto-and-sidewalk-labs-walks-backsome/ [https://perma.cc/Y88L-ZGM9] (describing a letter from interim City Manager
Giuliana Carbone to Waterfront Toronto calling for “more clarity around the city’s role in
approving any use of its land” and seeking an explicit statement that the project was for
Quayside only).
76. Jamie Powell, Sidewalk Toronto: Delays and NDAs, FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (July
2, 2018), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/07/02/1530507600000/Sidewalk-Toronto--delaysand-NDAs/ [https://perma.cc/37PJ-FYDF] (“[T]he opportunity cost of leaving the waterfront
site undeveloped until Google-fication is rolled out en masse theoretically totals billions of
Canadian dollars.”).
77. Memorandum from Serge Dupont to the Prime Minister of Can. (Feb. 21, 2017) (on
file with authors) (“WT has indicated that it will be difficult to get a technology partner with
deep pockets to commit to their smart city vision without a commitment by governments to
fund the [Port Lands Flood Protection Project], which would provide a valuable location for
the partner to scale up.”).
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Sidewalk’s messaging about the economic value of Quayside suggested that
the unimproved land was not worth all that much. While its book value for
WT was only about C$40 million, the actual value was more than ten times
this amount because the land had already been rezoned for the more desirable
mixed-use development.78 This discrepancy only added to the sense that the
project was moving too fast and returning to the public much less than full
value.
Over the summer of 2018, the Sidewalk Toronto project was not
proceeding smoothly. WT’s CEO Will Fleissig resigned,79 forced out under
pressure from the board.80 Several weeks later, and for entirely different
reasons, one of WT’s most prominent and experienced board members—real
estate developer Julie Di Lorenzo—resigned, claiming that contractual
provisions with Sidewalk (effectively requiring consensus positioning
between WT and Sidewalk) prevented her from exercising her fiduciary
duties over a project that had disappointed her from its commencement.81
She expressed dismay that Sidewalk had become WT’s “filter . . . gatekeeper
and . . . agent,” that it was being permitted to operate outside of the agency’s
procurement protocol, and that numerous questions about digital governance
and privacy remained unanswered.82 The Plan Development Agreement was
signed immediately after Di Lorenzo’s resignation.83 In addition, there were
resignations from the new Digital Strategy Advisory Panel that WT had set
up to advise on data issues, citing concerns about the lack of transparency,
integrity, and trust in the process and parties involved.84
C. Emerging Scope: Between the Plan Development Agreement and the
Master Innovation and Development Plan
On July 31, 2018, the Plan Development Agreement85 between WT and
Sidewalk replaced the Framework Agreement, which was finally made
78. Mariana Valverde, Public Lands, Private Control, and Housing Needs in the ‘Smart
City’ Quayside Development, CTR. FOR FREE EXPRESSION (Dec. 4, 2018), https://
cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2018/12/public-lands-private-control-and-housing-needs-smart-cityquayside-development [https://perma.cc/P4LH-PE2Q] (noting that Quayside “as it is already
zoned” is estimated to be worth “$500 to $600 million”).
79. Inori Roy, Waterfront Toronto CEO Will Fleissig to Step Down, STAR (July 4, 2018),
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2018/07/04/waterfront-toronto-ceo-will-fleissig-to-stepdown.html [https://perma.cc/V54G-5Q7W].
80. Amanda Roth, Fleissig, CEO of Waterfront Toronto, Pressured Out by Board, LOGIC
(July 6, 2018), https://thelogic.co/news/exclusive/fleissig-ceo-of-waterfront-torontopressured-out-by-board/ [https://perma.cc/D9T4-6WHP].
81. David Rider, Waterfront Toronto Deal with Google Sister Company Is
‘Shortchanging’ City, Says Board Member Who Quit, STAR (Aug. 2, 2018), https://
www.thestar.com/news/city_hall/2018/08/02/waterfront-toronto-deal-with-google-sistercompany-is-shortchanging-city-says-board-member-who-quit.html [https://perma.cc/8SU6T97L].
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Milan Gokhale, Towards a More Equitable Sidewalk Toronto, CTR. FOR FREE
EXPRESSION (Oct. 27, 2018), https://cfe.ryerson.ca/key-resources/commentary/towards-moreequitable-sidewalk-toronto [https://perma.cc/DF6W-F6K8].
85. See generally PDA, supra note 10.
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public on the same day it became defunct. The published texts—of both the
new and old agreements—offered for the first time some clarity on scope. In
terms of land, the full text of the Framework Agreement revealed that the
parties wanted the “solutions, processes and partnerships” developed at
Quayside to be applied “to subsequent developments on the Eastern
Waterfront, as those lands become available.”86 Further, an express part of
the work plan included “a process for the transfer and valuation of land for
purposes of implementation of the MIDP.”87 The PDA continued this theme,
stating that the MIDP “will include both plans for the Quayside Parcel and
plans at scale, including for the [eastern waterfront],” and acknowledging
that this could extend to “lands not owned or controlled by the Parties.”88
The clearest expression of scope appears in the exclusivity provisions of
each agreement. Both the Framework Agreement and the PDA prohibited
WT from investigating any other development of the entire eastern
waterfront during the term of each respective agreement, i.e., until the MIDP
was approved or the parties terminated the agreement.89 This period was
envisaged in the PDA to extend to December 31, 2019, and potentially
further,90 i.e., well over two years after Sidewalk won the RFP. This was—
despite the unambiguous provision in the RFP stating that WT would not be
entering into an exclusivity arrangement with its innovation and funding
partner91—a total change in position that accounts, perhaps, for some of the
parties’ confounding secrecy surrounding the agreements.
Three schedules of the PDA are of particular note: procurement,
intellectual property (IP), and digital governance. One of the Framework
Agreement’s milestones for continued collaboration between Sidewalk and
WT had been agreement on “fair and arms’-length procurement standards”
on the site.92 The procurement schedule established that Sidewalk would
control procurement before implementation of the MIDP at its option using
After implementation,
competitive procedures or sole sourcing.93
procurement standards would “seek to balance—in the public interest—the
use of market-based sourcing, on the one hand, and the direct facilitation of
Purposeful Solutions [technological innovations with no suitable market
alternatives] for innovation.”94 In other words, the PDA envisaged that
86. See Framework Agreement, supra note 39, § 8.
87. Id. § 15.
88. See PDA, supra note 10, at 32.
89. See Framework Agreement, supra note 39, § 45; see also PDA, supra note 10, at 15.
90. See PDA, supra note 10, at 14. A July 2019 amendment to the PDA replaced the date
“December 31, 2019,” with “December 31, 2020.” See Amending Agreement, WATERFRONT
TORONTO (July 31, 2019), https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/waterfront/
73ac1c93-665b-4fb8-b19b-6bfa23c2a427/PDA+July+31+Fully+Executed+%28002%29.pdf
?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/BN55-VVZE].
91. RFP, supra note 15, at 28.
92. See PDA, supra note 10, at 36.
93. Id. (stating that Sidewalk “may provide for competitive procurement (including an
invitational process soliciting bids from a set of qualified bidders) in appropriate
circumstances and may provide for sole sourcing in appropriate circumstances”).
94. Id.
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development of the site would be a mix of competitive procurement and sole
sourcing. What this means in practice is that Sidewalk, as the technology
partner, would be in a position to create technology procurement needs for
which it or another Alphabet-Google company would be a “Purposeful
Solution” or a sole-source provider. Again, this is anomalous for WT, given
the authority’s statement that, “[s]ince inception, our funding agreements
with our government partners have prohibited us from sole sourcing any
contract more than $75,000.”95
Moving to intellectual property, the intellectual property schedule
addresses how the benefits of innovation connected to the project will be
distributed between the parties. Here too, Sidewalk seems to be walking
away with a sweet deal. The PDA is ambiguous about just who will own the
data and insights generated by the Sidewalk Toronto project. The definition
clause identifies that various types of intellectual property will be part of the
project, including copyright material, IP in various products and services,
potential patentable inventions, and brands. It also states that “[o]ther types
of Intellectual Property may arise in the course of the MIDP, including
data.”96 This is followed by a clause substantially similar to what Google
affiliates have used before with public partners.97 In setting out what is
described as the “IP-related value drivers” brought by each partner to the
project, the PDA notes that Sidewalk brings “its experiences and learnings
accumulated in other markets” (limited, of course, given its youth).98 WT
brings something rather more tangible: first, “a meaningful test bed and
product/service trial venue at the MIDP Site” and second, “responsible
access to datasets necessary or useful to the design or prototyping of
Products and Services.”99 Strikingly, only the test bed is recognized as a
compensable contribution, with the goal being to ensure that the public is
“reasonably compensated” for the opportunities provided by the test bed.100
By contrast, there is a notable silence about any compensation for access to
datasets. This detail is a key plank of Sidewalk’s data strategy and an
important foundation for future developments. The short shrift given to WTfurnished data contrasts with the express recognition that Sidewalk will have
exclusive ownership of any IP that is generated on the site and not specified
or required by the deal—what is termed in the agreement “Non-MIDP Site
IP.”101
The data questions become more interesting in connection with the
schedule on digital governance, which sets out seven guiding digital design
95. Awarded Contracts, WATERFRONT TORONTO, https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/
connect/waterfront/waterfront_content_library/waterfront+home/procurement/awarded+cont
racts/awarded+contracts [https://perma.cc/JF9Y-9NL4] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
96. See PDA, supra note 10, at 41.
97. Julia Powles & Hal Hodson, Google DeepMind and Healthcare in an Age of
Algorithms, 7 HEALTH & TECH. 351, 354 (2017).
98. See PDA, supra note 10, at 41.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 42.
101. Id.
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principles—high-level aspirations for the collection and use of data in the
project, which incorporate many best practices. The language is ambitious
and borders on hyperbole. For example, one of the principles is to “create
the most privacy protected/citizen-centered set of policies and governance
structures in the world.”102 Another, picking up a trend from Europe, is to
“[e]xplore novel forms of data governance, such as . . . an independent data
trust with representation by both data subjects and citizens more
generally.”103 The principles also envisage
[n]ovel ownership structures for non-personal data, and associated open
protocols and rules, to ensure public policy objectives are met, including
access by and potential ownership of data by Waterfront Toronto, the City
of Toronto, Province of Ontario or Government of Canada or other such
third parties as deemed appropriate by the Parties.104

It is not clear how this schedule interacts overall with the provisions just
outlined in the intellectual property schedule, but the PDA does provide that
“[d]ata ownership will be addressed in greater detail through the MIDP.105
Some months after the release of the PDA, and one full year after the RFP
was awarded, Sidewalk elaborated on its data governance vision with what it
called a “Civic Data Trust” for the Sidewalk Toronto project.106 Under the
proposal, all data collected for the first time (or, we might say, “natively”) in
the physical space of the MIDP site would be classed as “Urban Data,” and
all access to, and use of, this data would be mediated by the Civic Data Trust,
which would treat all applications—from Sidewalk or anyone else—on the
same terms.107 In passing, the proposal distinguishes data collected through
websites or mobile phones but does not expressly exclude or limit those
sources if they are designed by Sidewalk or otherwise collecting native or
original data.108
Using the mechanism of a trust, what Sidewalk really seemed to be
proposing was to unilaterally redefine all data collected within the MIDP site
as Urban Data—from public spaces and from private ones, including
apartments, homes, and offices “not controlled by those who occupy them”

102. Id. at 47–48.
103. See id. at 47 (“The trust could carry a fiduciary responsibility to serve and balance
data subject and public interest within a framework that treats privacy from both a public as
well as a private good perspective.”).
104. Id. at 48.
105. Id.
106. See generally Sidewalk Labs, Digital Governance Proposals for DSAP Consultation,
WATERFRONT TORONTO (Oct. 15, 2018), https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/
waterfront/41979265-8044-442a-9351-e28ef6c76d70/18.10.15_SWT_Draft+Proposals+
Regarding+Data+Use+and+Governance.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
[https://perma.cc/QB2UB85Y].
107. Id. at 8, 37; see also Alyssa Harvey Dawson, An Update on Data Governance for
Sidewalk Toronto, MEDIUM (Oct. 16, 2018), https://medium.com/sidewalk-talk/an-update-ondata-governance-for-sidewalk-toronto-d810245f10f7 [https://perma.cc/RQ2M-FM5R].
108. See Sidewalk Labs, supra note 106, at 14 (“Urban Data is anchored to geography,
unlike data collected through websites and mobile phones, and lends itself to local
governance.”).
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(i.e., including any leased space or anywhere offered “as a service”).109 This
sleight of hand, creating a term unrecognized in law, would effectively negate
any default privacy setting: everything done within the bounds of the
Sidewalk Toronto project would be potentially up for grabs.110 Sean
McDonald warned, “proposing that Toronto should base ownership
determinations on the urbanity of a data set is a departure from Canadian data
ownership law and a precedent that, if approved, could extend far beyond
this project.”111 Sidewalk recommended that Urban Data should be “deidentified” by default, presumably by those collecting the data.112 It also
offered platitudes that the trust mechanism “would be on top of—not in place
of—existing law, regulation, and government enforcement.”113 For all that,
it is notable that the trust mechanism envisaged no limits on data collection
or use, nor did it ensure that there would be surveillance-free zones.114 Deidentification is a flea on the back of the elephant of data collection. Further,
and radically, the proposal takes the position that all de-identified data
(notwithstanding the problems associated with that concept) should be “open,
free, and available” by default—under a self-certification scheme that
involves no substantive review.115 This is the flea goading the elephant on a
rampage.
Experts question whether the trust has any basis in Canadian law,116 and
though it was proposed to ameliorate Sidewalk’s monopolization of data, the
109. Id. Sidewalk explains that “Urban Data is data collected in a physical space in the
city.” Id. This includes: “[p]ublic spaces, such as streets, squares, plazas, parks, and open
spaces”; “[p]rivate spaces accessible to the public, such as building lobbies, courtyards,
ground-floor markets, and retail stores”; and “[p]rivate spaces not controlled by those who
occupy them (e.g. apartment tenants).” Id. Sidewalk describes three types of Urban Data: (1)
data “[c]ollected in the public realm (e.g. pedestrian counters, street-facing cameras),” (2) data
“[c]ollected in privately-owned but publicly accessible spaces . . . e.g. cameras,” and (3) data
“[c]ollected in fully private spaces, generally homes or offices (e.g. thermostats, home security
cameras, sensors for building code compliance).” Id. at 16.
110. Sean McDonald, Toronto, Civic Data, and Trust, MEDIUM (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://medium.com/@McDapper/toronto-civic-data-and-trust-ee7ab928fb68
[https://perma.cc/ST49-G645] (“The proposal advocates for Toronto to specially consider
‘urban’ data as a unique category, which is then treated differently—here, ‘urban’ data would
be declared a ‘public asset,’ and then published. . . . Proposing quasi-nationalization of data
is a big deal . . . .”).
111. Id.
112. See Sidewalk Labs, supra note 106, at 9.
113. Id. at 13.
114. See danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data, 15 INFO. COMM.
& SOC’Y 662, 662–79 (2012).
115. See Sidewalk Labs, supra note 106, at 13, 15, 16.
116. Trusts under Canadian law are ways to manage assets that are owned for the benefit
of specific beneficiaries. Who owns the data that is contributed to the data trust? Since trust
owners designate beneficiaries, who would Sidewalk and other platform companies
designate? See Mariana Valverde, What Is a Data Trust and Why Are We Even Talking About
It?: Sidewalk Labs’ Magic Tricks, CTR. FOR FREE EXPRESSION (Jan. 14, 2019), https://
cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2019/01/what-data-trust-and-why-are-we-even-talking-about-itsidewalk-labs’-magic-tricks [https://perma.cc/9QJJ-59A5] (“[D]e-identifying data doesn’t
make it public, it just steers commercialization into certain channels; and making privately
owned data sets available doesn’t make them publicly owned.”); see also TORONTO REGION
BD. OF TRADE, BIBLIOTECH: BEYOND QUAYSIDE; A CITY-BUILDING PROPOSAL FOR THE
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proposal provided no defense against the company effectively enclosing the
benefits of a data commons using a dominant position in data collection and
analytics.117 One of the characteristics of vendor-made policy is that it need
not tie in with other governmental efforts. So here, it is unclear how a data
trust into which all public data is deposited fits in with Toronto’s existing
Open Data Master Plan,118 for example, or the work that Ontario and Canada
are undertaking on comprehensive data laws.
Even more fundamentally, the trust proposal distracts from the first-order
questions. Of these, the very first is: why is a vendor making policy? Next,
asked an observer, “why are we collecting any data at all?”119 And finally,
what happened to privacy by design? Within four days of the announcement
of the Civic Data Trust, Sidewalk’s most prominent privacy defender, Ann
Cavoukian, resigned because she said Sidewalk had reneged on its promise
that all data would be de-identified at the source.120 Her departure over such
a basic feature of data flows, fully one year into the project, showed just how
undeveloped or at least undisclosed the data policies were.121
The capstone to the interregnum between the PDA and MIDP releases was
the accidental revelation, finally, of Sidewalk’s business plan. Investigative
news reports broke on February 14, 2019, six months after release of the
PDA, that Sidewalk had been meeting regularly with government officials to
preview its real estate play in the Port Lands.122 It proposed to finance rail
infrastructure on the eastern waterfront in return for a cut of property taxes,123
arguing that it is “entitled to . . . a share in the uptick in land value on the
entire geography . . . [and] a share of developer charges and incremental tax
revenue on all land.”124 Sidewalk’s ambition for scale had been apparent,

TORONTO PUBLIC LIBRARY TO ESTABLISH A CIVIC DATA HUB (2019), https://www.bot.com/
Portals/0/Bibliotech%20-%20Final%20-%20Jan%208.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT28-3KW9]
(proposing that governance of Quayside data be moved to the public library).
117. See generally JOSE VAN DIJCK, THOMAS POELL & MARTIJN DE WAAL, THE PLATFORM
SOCIETY: PUBLIC VALUES IN A CONNECTIVE WORLD 154–55 (2018); ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA
REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
(2014).
118. Open Data Master Plan, CITY TORONTO, https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/
data-research-maps/open-data/open-data-master-plan/ [https://perma.cc/2YDZ-WSDL] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2019).
119. Gokhale, supra note 84.
120. Sean O’Shea, Ann Cavoukian, Former Ontario Privacy Commissioner, Resigns from
Sidewalk Labs, GLOBAL NEWS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://globalnews.ca/news/4579265/anncavoukian-resigns-sidewalk-labs/ [https://perma.cc/RYN7-4GJB].
121. Laura Bliss, How Smart Should a City Be?: Toronto Is Finding Out, CITYLAB (Sept.
7, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/design/2018/09/how-smart-should-a-city-be-toronto-isfinding-out/569116/ [https://perma.cc/487S-TDCM] (“Sidewalk Labs has provided little
information during the public engagement process about how data gathered at Quayside would
be owned and used.”).
122. Oved, supra note 14.
123. Id.; see also Framework Agreement, supra note 39, § 34 (In anticipation this strategy,
“[t]he parties will explore financing mechanisms that monetize the future economic impacts
(including through adjustments in tax assessments and other public fees) to sponsor
infrastructure.”).
124. Oved, supra note 14.
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but oblique.125 Within the space of a year and with no public engagement,
Sidewalk had seemingly abandoned its reassurances that the scope of the
project was modest and “additive,”126 that it would proceed slowly from
proven testing, piloting, and stakeholder engagement at Quayside, and that
“geography can be a discussion after the plan is finished.”127 The news that
February morning revealed something far more audacious: Sidewalk CEO
Dan Doctoroff’s assertion that “if there is no light rail through the project,
then the project is not interesting to us”128 and the plan for the neverpreviously discussed Villiers Island to house a thirty-four-to-forty-six-acre
Google development.129 Meanwhile, on Toronto’s information page on
“Current Projects” for the Waterfront Secretariat, the Sidewalk Toronto
project continued to be referred to as restricted to Quayside, to twelve-acres,
and to a carefully bound scope,130 with no mention of the entire site.
To recap what we learned during the first eighteen months of the Sidewalk
Toronto project:
(1) A public authority partnered with a big tech company to scope out a
new urban district. The initial terms of the collaboration were kept secret
from the public and public officials for nine-and-a-half months. The terms
of the evolving MIDP, which will ultimately govern the project, were secret
for at least eighteen months.
(2) The process for public engagement was staged and managed by the
company, with the public as well as relevant public officials kept out of key
consultations.
(3) During the working out of plan details, the public invested C$1.25
billion on real property improvements, while at the same time the public
125. See Media Events, supra note 27; see also Dan Doctoroff, Sidewalk Toronto Project
Update, MEDIUM (Feb. 14, 2019), https://medium.com/sidewalk-toronto/sidewalk-torontoproject-update-d44738cdb239 [https://perma.cc/V8AW-3EAB] (“[M]uch of what’s possible
is only viable when different aspects of the project — particularly related to infrastructure —
incorporate portions of the Eastern Waterfront.”).
126. Sidewalk Toronto, Neighbourhood Meeting with the West Don Lands Committee,
QUAYSIDE 2 (Feb. 26, 2018), https://quaysideto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/West-DonLands-Committee-Summary-Notes-February-26-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2HM-9P8F]
(“Quayside is a start of ideas . . . . We’re here to be additive.”).
127. Sidewalk Toronto, Neighbourhood Meeting with the Corktown Residents and
Business Association, QUAYSIDE (June 5, 2018), https://quaysideto.ca/wp-content/uploads/
2019/04/Corktown-Residents-and-Business-Association-Meeting-Summary-Notes-June-52018.pdf [https://perma.cc/36MV-7CDZ] (“We don’t pre-suppose how interested the City is
in all this. . . . If the testing or piloting works on Quayside, then the Port Lands could be
another opportunity to advance towards. But it’s important not to pre-suppose and say would
could happen. . . . Nothing is committed at this time.”).
128. Tara Deschamps, Sidewalk Labs May Lose Interest in Quayside Project If Transit Isn’t
Built, CEO Says, FIN. POST (Mar. 7, 2019), https://business.financialpost.com/pmn/businesspmn/sidewalk-labs-could-pull-out-of-quayside-project-if-transit-isnt-built-ceo-says
[https://perma.cc/Q544-X6GQ].
129. See Doctoroff, supra note 125; Project Update, SIDEWALK TORONTO 10 (Feb. 14,
2019),
https://storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/
13210348/FEB14-SWTO-Business-Case-Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ4K-D3FZ].
130. Quayside, CITY TORONTO, https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/planningdevelopment/waterfront/initiatives/current-projects/quayside/ [https://perma.cc/SND7-6H44]
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
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authority was contractually precluded from considering other developers,
despite it having solicited proposals on the express condition that the
agreement was nonexclusive.
(4) Within the geographic bounds of the project, which pivoted from a
mere twelve-acres to a sprawling 880-acres, the tech company unilaterally
redefined all data collected natively from the site as “Urban Data,” subject to
rule by a poorly defined Civic Data Trust.
(5) Numerous resignations of high-profile advisors to the project and
public opposition did not slow down the process or cause a rethinking of the
whole approach, which moved on despite there being inadequate policies in
place to deal with data governance, procurement, intellectual property, and
many other fundamental aspects of the project.
II. SIDEWALK’S PLATFORM GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS
We now turn from the troubled launch of the Sidewalk Toronto project to
the main dangers of such a venture, if realized, to democratic governance.
To some degree, this substantive critique stands on its own, independent of
the secrecy and slipperiness of the launch process. But in other respects, the
initial process deficiencies represent and intensify concerns related to the
imagined city. After describing Sidewalk’s vision for Toronto’s smart city
platform, based principally on a close reading of the vision section of
Sidewalk’s submitted response to the RFP,131 as elaborated in public
statements over the first eighteen months of the project, we identify three
major pitfalls for the public: privatization, platformization, and domination.
A. The City as Platform: Sidewalk’s Vision
One of the central rhetorical pivots of Sidewalk’s imaginings for the
Toronto waterfront is what it terms the “digital layer.” The digital layer is an
animating idea for the project, rather than a material reality.132 The digital
layer runs through, under, and around the “physical layer” of the built
environment. It consists of data and the things data touches, like sensors and
cameras, data analytics and storage, wireless and wired infrastructure, and
portals and devices. The digital layer is in essence Sidewalk’s version of the
“platform concept,” which creates “the baseline conditions for urban
innovation.”133 With the use of this language, Sidewalk explicitly adopts the
metaphor of the “city as platform”134 and invites the city itself to emulate the
131. Request for Proposals No. 2017-13 Response: Project Vision, SIDEWALK LABS (Oct.
17, 2017), https://storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
13210553/Sidewalk-Labs-Vision-Sections-of-RFP-Submission.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZTMQ6J9] [hereinafter Vision]. Only a portion of Sidewalk’s response to the RFP has been made
public.
132. Sidewalk Toronto, Meet Sidewalk Toronto: Kristina and Craig Talk Open Urban
Data, YOUTUBE (Mar. 29, 2018), https://youtu.be/LKN_EHkjCcs [https://perma.cc/MUY3QTHH].
133. Vision, supra note 131, at 17.
134. This formulation has been used elsewhere as an analytical frame for digitally
networked urban governance. See generally, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, ASPEN INST., THE CITY AS
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platform technology companies like Amazon and Google that cities hope to
attract.135 Sidewalk sells the digital layer as the engine for the edge
innovation, the startups, and the tech businesses of the silicon idyll.
Figure 1: The City as Platform136

In the idealized city as platform, ubiquitous sensors will feed data into
automated street design, turning streets as needed into conduits for bikes or
pedestrians or priority vehicles. Data will enable flexible use of streets,
buildings, and public space as changing demands are sensed and datafied.
Responsive applications built on top of the platform can efficiently deliver
services (from food to sanitation to work space) “just-in-time” for public
consumption. The platform design explicitly recapitulates the internet’s
network architecture:
Just as computer and smartphone operating systems keep the device
running smoothly but also allow innovators to create new apps, the digital
layer is designed to keep the city running smoothly but also encourage
residents, staff, startups, and larger companies to bring their most creative
ideas to bear on improving life in the city.137

PLATFORM: HOW DIGITAL NETWORKS ARE CHANGING URBAN LIFE AND GOVERNANCE (2016),
http://csreports.aspeninstitute.org/documents/CityAsPlatform.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JLL7RA55]; STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & NEIL KLEIMAN, A NEW CITY O/S: THE POWER OF OPEN,
COLLABORATIVE, AND DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE (2017); Tim O’Reilly, Government as a
Platform, INNOVATIONS, Jan. 2011, at 13.
135. See generally Jathan Sadowski & Roy Bendor, Selling Smartness: Corporate
Narratives and the Smart City as a Sociotechnical Imaginary, 440 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES
540 (2018).
136. Vision, supra note 131, app. at 19.
137. Id. at 66.
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Indeed, in 2016, Sidewalk analogized the city to the network stack of a
computer operating system, in which citizen services and even city
administration itself become just user-facing applications, driven through the
digital layer.138 This is “public administration as app,” with policy and
accountability pushed to the edge of a network run on infrastructure owned
and operated by someone else.
Figure 2: The City as a Network Stack139

Sidewalk’s vision for Toronto’s eastern waterfront is a network of
neighborhoods “networked . . . to operate at a system scale, like the internet,
generating advantages that increase with each new node.”140 The internet, as
a network of networks, confers obvious connectivity advantages. But what
is the advantage of networked neighborhoods when one of the meanings of
neighborhood is to be distinct and set apart? In Sidewalk’s vision, it is to
attract businesses to supply goods and services through the platform.
“Whereas a neighbourhood of a few thousand people will produce a modest
market opportunity to attract third parties to the platform, a district of
networked neighbourhoods will be powerful enough to draw companies and
entrepreneurs from all over to take part in Toronto’s new ecosystem.”141
In all aspects of Sidewalk’s envisioned city design, data is infrastructural.
It is the foundation for all downstream production of goods and services.142
138. Sidewalk Labs, Reimagining the City as a Digital Platform, YOUTUBE (Feb. 22,
2016), https://youtu.be/bPu8HvD7d9U [https://perma.cc/HT6C-8UJY] (“What if you could
innovate across the whole stack, all at once . . . in a city?”).
139. Id.
140. See Vision, supra note 131, at 21.
141. Id.; see also id. at 51–54 (describing the eastern waterfront as a “[n]eighbourhood of
neighbourhoods”).
142. See generally BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF
SHARED RESOURCES 61–114 (2012); Jean-Christophe Plantin et al., Infrastructure Studies
Meet Platform Studies in the Age of Google and Facebook, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 293
(2018).
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Private functions like commerce, public ones like building inspections, and
hybrid ones like housing or transportation are all mediated by data flows,
predictive analytics, and automated decisions. Urban governance is
reconceptualized as facilitating the collection and transmission of data to
applications and services that run on top of the platform.143 In effect, the city
morphs from polis to bazaar, from a place of thick ties to thin transactions
where digital bids connect people to services and applications.
B. Privatization
The marketplace model for the city highlights the business orientation of
a project that from the start failed the first test of public administration:
engaging the governed.144 Even with formal institutional approval at the
outset, there is a danger that a project like Sidewalk Toronto achieves private
gain at the expense of the public—incrementally but comprehensively, from
planning to implementation. Above, we discussed IP ownership and data
control, through which the privatization of public assets can be achieved
alongside old-fashioned land deals. Here, we turn to governance.
Hidden in Sidewalk’s fine renderings of mass timber construction,
adaptable roads, and configurable parks lies the most significant feature of
the deal: the substantial delegation of public governance to a private
platform. Whoever controls the “digital layer” of the city exerts control over
the activities transacted through it. Sidewalk designed the digital layer and
Sidewalk affiliates may operate it, intermediating access to traditional public
spaces and services, like the curb, sidewalks, parks, and transport, as well as
to private ones, like housing, health, and thermostats. As more and more of
life is transacted through the digital layer, regulation and its reach are
encoded in that layer, as discussed below.145
WT signaled out of the gate that it was willing to cede governance. Its
RFP sought a partner to “create the required governance constructs to
stimulate the growth of an urban innovation cluster, including legal
frameworks (e.g., intellectual property, privacy, data sharing).”146 From the
start, a public entity tasked a vendor, doing service also as developer and
planner, with making public policy. Among the most important levers of
urban governance are planning, regulation, and enforcement.147 Sidewalk,
143. Another layer—the “standards layer”—provides an interface between the digital layer
and the “residents, administrators, and developers using and building atop the platform.”
Vision, supra note 131, at 18.
144. The public fora that Sidewalk Toronto hosted did not meet the mark. They skated
over data collection, procurement, IP, and other issues, while focusing public attention on
much less contested questions about building materials and amenities.
145. If code is law, then the digital layer, embodying code, is law. See LAWRENCE LESSIG,
CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).
146. See RFP, supra note 15, at 17.
147. JONATHAN F. P. ROSE, THE WELL-TEMPERED CITY: WHAT MODERN SCIENCE, ANCIENT
CIVILIZATIONS, AND HUMAN NATURE TEACH US ABOUT THE FUTURE OF URBAN LIFE 138
(2016) (identifying several levers of city control: “vision of the city; a master plan for how to
implement the vision, with specific indicators of its components; data collection so that the
city has intelligence about its circumstances and can create feedback mechanisms to [achieve
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like any company in this position, may be able to exert significant control
over how all are conducted, with no credible social license for doing so.
1. Planning
Simply by wielding the “pen” in designing the master plan for Toronto’s
new neighborhood, Sidewalk has exercised a significant public planning
function. Many cities have “digital master plans”148 or “smart city” plans
that are city-led.149 The city and its residents identify the problems and
define the solution space. With Sidewalk Toronto, by contrast, Sidewalk
defines the problems and the solutions that Alphabet companies, it seems,
will be uniquely positioned to supply. Sidewalk may design the arena for its
own advantage and then play in it as a real property “vertical developer,”150
as a digital layer (perhaps sole-source) vendor, and as an infrastructure
owner.151
Though Sidewalk boasted that it undertook unprecedented public
engagement in the lead-up to the MIDP—consulting “literally 20,000
people”152—the detailed chronology set out in Part I above shows that the
public and responsible authorities were blocked from the real action. The
Framework Agreement, which governed the first nine-and-a-half months of
the deal, was pushed through the WT board without enabling time for
deliberation, consensus, or amendment. City councilors and citizens were
not shown the agreement until it was obsolete, replaced by a new agreement,
the PDA. Again, that agreement was formed in private, ushering in facts on
the ground without public deliberation or engagement. It is difficult to know
where to anchor serious scrutiny. On one day, Sidewalk dumped into the
public realm two privately formed final agreements, problematic and
unanticipated terms for ongoing procurement and intellectual property
management, data governance nostrums, as well as sweeping design
fantasies.153 And then there was the mystification of scope. For at least
fifteen months, the project partners framed the scope of the project as being
principally about Quayside, a relatively modest twelve-acre waterfront site.
its vision]; regulations, such as zoning and building codes; incentives, including tax credits
and loan guarantees; and investments in infrastructure such as transportation, water, and sewer
systems”).
148. Anthony Townsend & Stephen Lorimer, Digital Master Planning: An Emerging
Strategic Practice in Global Cities (N.Y.U. Marron Inst. of Urban Mgmt., Working Paper No.
25, 2015), https://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/uploads/content/Working_Paper_25_Digital_
Master_Planning.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5BR-A2R6] (describing the digital master plans of
Chicago, London, San Francisco, Dublin, Singapore, and Hong Kong, as well as New York
City’s “Roadmap” and Barcelona’s “Smart City Strategy,” both written in 2011).
149. See, e.g., CITY OF CHI., THE CITY OF CHICAGO TECHNOLOGY PLAN (2013),
https://techplan.cityofchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/cityofchicago-techplan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VFQ5-VZ7J]; CITY OF PHILA., SMARTCITYPHL (2018), https://
www.phila.gov/media/20190204121858/SmartCityPHL-Roadmap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
NR6Y-CV47].
150. See PDA, supra note 10, at 6.
151. See Oved, supra note 14.
152. See Media Events, supra note 30.
153. See supra Part I.C.
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In February 2019, however, it became apparent that the project really
concerned the entire 880-acre waterfront stretch, which confirmed critics’
and cynics’ worst suspicions.154
Meanwhile, the city and its citizens would have to wait for at least another
eighteen months for the release of the MIDP, a document that would
ultimately run over 1500 pages155 and was negotiated in secret along the lines
of the earlier agreements. While concerns about data governance and privacy
were constantly volleyed between critics and defenders of the deal, these
merely served to embed a sense of inevitability about the problematic aspects
being examined here involving privatization, platformization, and
domination. At no point was there any capacity, either at the government
level or within the processes of the project partners themselves, to surface
and protect against any of these areas of concern.
The privatization of planning proceeds apace as the imagined city
develops. In Sidewalk’s vision, the networked neighborhood is continuously
planned even after the arena is built and the game is underway. Digital layer
data will enable ongoing modeling of urban infrastructure needs. Indeed,
Sidewalk envisions a “[m]odel component . . . [that] can simulate ‘what if’
scenarios for city operations to inform long-term planning decisions.”156
Given the amount of data that Sidewalk is likely to have, its planning tools
will have significant advantages over competitors and almost certainly boost
Sidewalk’s prospects as a planner. It seems likely that the model will be
implemented by the Sidewalk affiliate Replica. This tool creates data
facsimiles of real populations by scrambling the personal data of real people
into synthetic copies of “virtual” individuals.157 Replica has already proven
to the satisfaction of one jurisdiction that its technology is without peer,
having won a sole-source contract with the state of Illinois to provide
mobility data.158
154. See supra Part I.B.
155. See Sidewalk Lab’s Proposal: Master Innovation and Development Plan, QUAYSIDE,
https://quaysideto.ca/sidewalk-labs-proposal-master-innovation-and-development-plan/
[https://perma.cc/Y7XM-7Y4S] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019); see also supra Part I.B.
156. NICOLAS DOUAY, URBAN PLANNING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 30 (2018). Douay describes
a generic big data algorithmic planning process as one that selects “the best choice according
to the intentions, scripts or scenarios from which it was designed. . . . [It embodies] visions
of the world, the city as well as planning processes, even if these projections may be
unconscious or at least not very explicit.” Id.
157. Sidewalk Labs, Replica: A Next-Generation Urban Planning Tool, YOUTUBE (Aug.
24, 2018), https://youtu.be/YKIrSUCeOtU [https://perma.cc/2QDX-RXZC] (explaining that
Replica is “a tool to explore how, where, when, and why people move around a region” based
on millions of people’s full details of daily life); see also Ava Kofman, Google’s Sidewalk
Labs Plans to Package and Sell Location Data on Millions of Cellphones, INTERCEPT (Jan. 28,
2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/28/google-alphabet-sidewalk-labs-replica-cellphonedata/[ https://perma.cc/ZU5T-YUKG].
158. Sidewalk Labs Replica Tool and Data Notice, ILL. DEP’T TRANSP.,
https://webapps.dot.illinois.gov/WCTB/ConstructionSupportNotice/BulletinItem/0ff7ba8881f7-4cd8-b24b-bc153d493725?page=1 [https://perma.cc/DW6G-HV4C] (last visited Oct. 6,
2019) (Replica “uses a number of sources, including mobile carrier data, location data from
third-party aggregators and Google location data, to generate travel data for a region. . . .
[T]he data sample is not limited to only Android devices. Additionally, these data are
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2. Regulation and Enforcement
As discussed in Part I above, Sidewalk’s development of a data
governance regime for Quayside provoked criticism that policymaking was
being privatized without the normal process of hearings, open records, and
accountability.159 This private lawmaking could become harder to see, but
no less pronounced, after ground is broken and control moves to the “cloud”
of data flows. Control of data and data analytics confers regulatory power:
permissions to and prohibitions against. The digital layer, if realized
according to Sidewalk’s vision, effectuates permissions and prohibitions,
including those governing curbside parking and driving speeds, in all cases
dynamic and demand-based.160 Such agility will require highly responsive
and mutable law that leaves the details of “saying what the law is” and,
perhaps even of enforcement, to the platform. Land use and trash regulation
provide two examples.
When it comes to land, traditional Euclidean zoning deploys bureaucratic
codes to specify distinct land uses, geographically separated, in order to limit
negative externalities imposed on neighbors.161 Sidewalk envisions
something different on the future waterfront: an “outcome-based code to
govern the built environment.”162 The code would consist of “a new set of
simplified, highly responsive rules that focus more on monitoring outputs
than broadly regulating inputs.”163 Land would not be zoned for residential
or manufacturing purposes but instead opened up to flexible use, provided
that the use does not exceed some measure of impact (e.g., noise, smoke,
traffic) outside the “envelope” of exclusivity. This vision of patrolling
dynamically for negative externalities, rather than zoning for compatible
uses, requires performance targets and “embedded sensing for real-time
monitoring.” Sidewalk nominates itself to develop this system of “automated
regulation.” Sidewalk’s procurement and development proposals put it in
limina between the regulated and regulator and its automated zoning is ruled
collected from individuals for months at a time, allowing for a complete picture of individual
travel patterns.”) According to the notice, the estimated award for providing this data over
thirty-six months is US$3.6 million. Id.
159. See Governing by Mercenary, supra note 62 (“Instead of debating, say a data and
privacy policy in Cabinet or municipal government, then pitching it through the media,
debating it in the legislature, voting on it, recording that vote for the next election, then
entrenching it in statute and regulations; instead of all that (aka democracy) . . . . The
mercenary just gets the job done, and gets paid. There is no vote, no debate, no statute, no
regulation, no accountability.”).
160. This is a general aspiration of smart city development. See ROSE, supra note 147, at
151 (noting that the smart city “may tune its zoning code, infrastructure investments, and
incentives in real time for public benefit”).
161. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Another
way to view traditional zoning is as a tool to preserve positive externalities, or the commons.
See Sheila R. Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
281, 311–12 (2016) (“Through its system of separation and exclusion, zoning protects the
commons, at various scales, by helping to create and then preserve the ‘character’ of the city,
neighborhood, or block.”).
162. See Vision, supra note 131, at 120.
163. Id.
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by public law.164 At the same time, it may enjoy “substantial forbearances
from existing laws and regulations.”165
The distance between regulation and enforcement can be short in an
automated system. Sidewalk claims that the outcome-based code “will
reward positive behaviors and penalize negative ones.”166 What sort of
process will there be around penalties? Will outcomes simply be chosen by
majority rule, dependent on constant connectivity and prompts?167 Will the
government have the opportunity to set enforcement priorities? Dystopic
visions abound of a new cannon of “personalized law,”168 adjoined to
constant surveillance or what Rob Kitchin calls “control creep” and
“anticipatory governance.”169 Landlords in some cities are already taking
advantage of smart apartments to remotely lock out tenants over alleged
contractual violations.170 Might these private dispute resolutions, which
complement or replace public ordering, be outsourced to the digital layer?
And if they are, who will control the lawmaking resident in the code?
Sidewalk’s command of the early stage of development suggests an answer.
Another example, this time in trash disposal regulation, shows that even if
the government sets regulatory standards and enforces them, control over
data can serve a de facto private lawmaking function. Sidewalk expects to
“deploy a digitally enabled smart chute system that will help pay-as-youthrow waste regimes succeed in multifamily buildings by making it possible
to differentiate between recyclables and trash.”171 In other words, the data
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Sidewalk’s head of engineering, Craig Nevill-Manning, uses an example of what is
possible through such code and governance: “Imagine I want to have a block party . . . . We
can quickly survey everybody who lives around and get them to say, sort of, thumbs up,
thumbs down; if we get enough thumbs up, kind of, the permit is automatically issued.”
Sidewalk Toronto, supra note 132.
168. The University of Chicago Law Review recently held a symposium on the topic of
“personalized law.” See Symposium on Personalized Law, U. CHI. L. REV.,
http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/symposium-personalized-law [https://perma.cc/BB7P-TXY4]
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
169. See KITCHIN, supra note 117, at 178–79; see also Torin Monahan, Surveillance as
Governance: Social Inequality and the Pursuit of Democratic Surveillance, in SURVEILLANCE
AND DEMOCRACY 91, 98 (K. D. Haggerty & M. Samatas eds., 2010); Jathan Sadowski & Frank
Pasquale, A Spectrum of Control: A Social Theory of the Smart City, FIRST MONDAY (July 6,
2015),
https://firstmonday.org/article/view/5903/4660
[https://perma.cc/DL8K-F2YF]
(discussing Lawrence Solum’s thought experiment about the thoroughly instrumented city
simply lifting traffic offenders from the streets with strategically placed cranes).
170. Alfred Ng, Tenants Worry Smart-Home Tech Could Be Abused by Landlords, CNET
(Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/tenants-worry-smart-home-tech-could-beabused-by-landlords/ [https://perma.cc/99SY-DNV8].
171. See Vision, supra note 131, at 22. Elsewhere, Sidewalk Labs says that the only sensors
it “expects to deploy include (1) air quality sensors (carbon monoxide, particulate matter,
sulfur dioxide); (2) noise level sensors (noise generated by vehicles, construction, human
activity); (3) radar, laser rangefinding, and computer vision (flow of vehicles, cyclists,
pedestrians, state of the urban environment); and (4) hyperlocal weather (temperature, wind
speed, humidity).” Id. at 72. The development of Replica, however, shows that intensive
location tracking is also within view.
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about disposal patterns—some of it invariably sensitive and revealing172—
will be used to meter disposal fees. This data may be combined with other
personal data to “nudge” individual consumption and disposal habits and
might become what Karen Yeung has called a “hypernudge.”173 Sidewalk
will apparently control this sensor-based chute data. City officials will access
this data through an app, like any other user. The city, in this vision, is
reduced to a client. It stands in the shoes of the third-party app developer,
with no greater access or authority than any other player.174
C. Platformization
Sidewalk’s vision raises another consequential concern for urban
governance that is harder to define: these are the issues inherent in a city-asplatform model that radically unbundles systems, spaces, and services into
sets of transactions optimized according to market logic. The model has been
theorized as a way of using public data to catalyze economic activity and
improve city services.175 In broad strokes, there are two distinct versions of
platform values. In one version, the city intermediates between the public’s
data and service providers, prioritizing public benefit. In the other,
commercial platforms like Facebook and Uber intermediate, prioritizing
profit or market share. Sidewalk obscures just which version of platform its
digital layer will be and what it will be optimized for.
The primary function of Sidewalk’s digital layer is to “collect[] data on the
urban environment via sensors.”176 Who is doing the collecting is left vague.
In some iterations, the disembodied platform is itself the agent. It “detects
pedestrian congestion,” for example, and then it “can experiment with ways
to create better pedestrian flow.”177 This suggests that maybe the platform
will be public in some sense, like basic infrastructure, and commercial
entities will access it from the edge. Elsewhere, Sidewalk itself claims
agency. It is Sidewalk that will “experiment . . . with various weather
mitigation strategies . . . [and] get real-time feedback . . . from a high-density
mesh of sensors . . . [to] enable the real-time evaluation of different
interventions.”178 In this case, it seems that the platform will be commercial.
Commercial entities, or at least Sidewalk, will provide the utility.
172. Ann Cavoukian Talks About Civil Liberties Group and Sidewalk Labs, JOHN OAKLEY
SHOW (Apr. 18, 2019), https://omny.fm/shows/the-john-oakley-show/ann-cavoukian-talksabout-civil-liberties-group-an [https://perma.cc/WQC4-7Q9U].
173. See generally Karen Yeung, ‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by
Design, 20 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 118 (2017).
174. See Digital Strategy Advisory Panel Technology Update, SIDEWALK TORONTO (Dec.
13, 2018), https://storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/
13210444/12.13.18_SWL_DSAP.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL6M-UDBN].
175. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
176. See Vision, supra note 131, at 33.
177. Id. at 79.
178. Id. When a company is allowed to deploy sensors in exchange for feeding the data to
the city, the city’s access to that data depends on the continuation of the deal. LinkNYC kiosks
allow Sidewalk to gather environmental data the city needs “to meet public health regulations
and figure out the ‘livability’ of streets” in exchange for giving the company “a playground
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Crucially, ambiguity about the platform depoliticizes questions of
planning, frustrates accountability, and removes points of entry for citizen
contestation. Because the digital layer is conspicuously designed with the
internet as a model, it seems only appropriate to extrapolate platform values
from existing digital platforms. Chief among them are efficiency and
datafication, both of which are problematic as foundational values for cities
and urban life.
1. Efficiency
The presentation of the digital layer in Sidewalk’s vision demonstrates
something of the nonchalant “no worries” assurances of neutrality that
accompanied the rollout of information platforms in the early 2000s.
Tarleton Gillespie points out that the metaphor of the platform as a “raised
level surface” abets the claim of neutrality.179 But platforms are not
neutral.180 Online platforms “intervene in and reshape value regimes and
economies.”181 They advance a substantive vision of the good—whether that
is “engagement” on social media or cheap rides through Uber—and enforce
that vision through data flows.182 Similarly, smart city technologies might
be “portrayed and positioned as technical, pragmatic, common-sensical, and
non-ideological,” but in reality, they “are inherently politically and
ideologically loaded in vision and application, reshaping in particular ways
how cities are managed and regulated.”183
To be sure, Sidewalk’s vision aims to hit ambitious targets for affordable
housing, sustainability, inclusion, and other public goods.184 These are
for building new services.” Mark Harris, Inside Alphabet’s Money-Spinning, TerroristFoiling, Gigabit Wi-Fi Kiosks, RECODE (July 1, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.recode.net/
2016/7/1/12072122/alphabet-sidewalk-labs-city-wifi-sidewalk-kiosks
[https://perma.cc/
KZZ9-Q97G] (quoting Alexei Pozdnoukhov, director of the Smart Cities Research Center).
179. Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms,’ 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347, 350–52
(2010) (elaborating on the meanings of “platform” and the canny use of the term to suggest “a
progressive and egalitarian arrangement, promising to support those who stand upon it,” while
eliding the exclusionary and directive possibilities of particular platform arrangements).
180. Anupam Chander & Vivek Krishnamurthy, The Myth of Platform Neutrality, 2 GEO.
L. TECH. REV. 400 (2018).
181. See VAN DIJCK, POELL & DE WAAL, supra note 117, at 24, 25 (“The questions whose
interests a platform’s activity serves, which values are at stake and who benefits are central in
disputes concerning the creation of public value in the platform society.”).
182. Ellen P. Goodman & Julia Powles, Facebook and Google: Most Powerful and
Secretive Empires We’ve Ever Known, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2016, 3:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/28/google-facebook-powerful-secretiveempire-transparency [https://perma.cc/T959-FV2W].
183. Rob Kitchin et al., Smart Cities and the Politics of Urban Data, in SMART URBANISM:
UTOPIAN VISION OR FALSE DAWN? 16, 17–18 (Simon Marvin, Andrés Luque-Ayala & Colin
McFarlane eds., 2015).
184. Draft Quayside Site Plan, SIDEWALK TORONTO 20, 24–25 (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/13210448/
18.11.29_Quayside_Draft_Site-Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/FAN3-SFZZ] (claiming that the
Quayside development will result in a 75–85 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
and that 40 percent of the site will be dedicated to below-market housing); see also Jesse
Shapins, Quayside: A New Vision for Toronto’s Waterfront, MEDIUM (Nov. 29, 2018),
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values imposed from outside the platform, congruent with Sidewalk’s
ambitions to build in Toronto an idealized prototype, uninhibited by revenue
demands and supported by patient capital. But the values structurally
embedded in the platform are not these. The city as platform privileges
efficiency.185 In Sidewalk’s vision, living, working, and moving—and, as
discussed in the previous section, governing—are all modules on a platform
connecting users to services through data. Here is where Sidewalk’s
definition of “urban data” (i.e., data collected in a physical space in the city)
comes into its own and has its most pernicious effects. Essentially, apart
from completely personally owned spaces and devices—an increasing rarity
in the envisioned waterfront—all places become exposed and marketized.
Formerly static assets—whether that is park space, curb space, marketspace,
office space, or housing space—are provided “as a service,” just-in-time,
according to usage needs.186 Planning is a continuous process that happens
in real time in response to flows of urban data, so that urban resources are
allocated to entertainment, quiet reflection, food trucks, cycling, or housing
based on constantly refreshing data inputs about demand, possibly filtered
through the profit motive of platform players.
As Adam Greenfield has observed, platform technics reduce friction
between impulse and consumption.187 The ease of platform-mediated
consumption can “short-circuit the process of reflection that stands between
one’s recognition of a desire and its fulfillment via the market.”188 It is
possible that the demand the platform registers should not be gratified upon
considered reflection or upon considering the collective good. If we imagine
that in any given moment, there is more demand to play soccer in a field than
to reseed it, the platform will deliver soccer. If there is more demand
(measured by those placing the most orders) for instant drone delivery than
for a walk to the corner shop, retail will succumb. This is the continuous
planning process that currently favors cheap ride-shares over public
transportation. A brutally efficient demand-driven city-as-platform model
might perhaps be able to accommodate public interests by accounting for
negative and positive externalities in the model (e.g., congestion pricing).
For this to happen, regulators and coders would have to collaborate. The
studied ambiguity of Sidewalk Toronto about agency in the digital layer,
https://medium.com/sidewalk-toronto/quayside-a-new-vision-for-torontos-waterfront60d969d16c5f [https://perma.cc/A4W3-2YU5].
185. See KITCHIN, supra note 117, at 113–27.
186. See Vision, supra note 131, at 18 (describing “mobility as a service”); see also id. at
19 (“Sidewalk also will pilot a public realm management system, enabled by sensor arrays,
that monitors air quality, asset conditions, and usage, helping managers respond quickly to
emerging needs, from broken benches to overflowing waste bins. This system will enable
tests of reservable outdoor spaces for short-term uses, such as pop-up shops. Using flexible
building structures, Sidewalk is exploring a next-gen bazaar, a tech-enabled makerspace with
activity stalls that can be refreshed quickly”).
187. ADAM GREENFIELD, RADICAL TECHNOLOGIES: THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY LIFE 36
(2017).
188. Id. (discussing “the colonization of the domestic environment by . . . networked
products and services”).
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coupled with the embrace of privatized regulation, undermines confidence
that such a collaboration would work in the public interest.
Platform discourse tends to avoid the tensions between the public interest,
on one side, and efficiency or market value on the other. It fuses them. José
van Dijck observes that, “[i]n the platform society, the creation of public
value toward the common good is often confused with the creation of
economic value serving a nondescript amalgam of private and public
interests.”189 Sidewalk incorporates public value concepts, leaning on Jane
Jacobs’s vision of “placemaking” along with new urbanism and
sustainability. Sidewalk says it wants to pursue “[s]ocial cohesion and civic
engagement.”190 These are the public values exogenous to the platform. But
the method offered to attain these values is always and only digital
connectivity—the platform. Again, if the digital layer is controlled by the
public or their representatives, according to public standards, checks, and
balances, it could conceivably be optimized for the public interest. But if
controlled by Sidewalk or other commercial vendors, it will most likely be
optimized for efficiency and the efficient production of material value.
2. Datafication
Platforms designed for efficiency break down the material and social
world into data flows. All activities—work, leisure in public, leisure in
private, transport—are part of the flow. The built environment will facilitate
the data flow and be constructed by it. If allowed to, platforms will try to
parse every bit of existence into data. This kind of datafication has prosocial
and antisocial implications.
On the “pro” side, structures “optimized for optionality”191 create
flexibility in urban shelter. Sidewalk depicts lofts that are designed to park
cars until such time as autonomous vehicles reduce the demand for parking;
thereafter they can be repurposed, floor-by-floor, pod-by-pod, for residential
or other use. Such “radical mixed-use”192 can in theory create more
affordable housing and “incremental real estate value.”193 In addition, the
“radical sharing of durable goods,”194 like cars, home appliances, and tools,
can, again in theory, improve efficiency and reduce resource use.
On the “anti” side, the atomization of space into modules for work and
sleep enacts a new scheme of value extraction in space that can effectuate
“the extension of economic rationality into every corner of human life.”195
189. See VAN DIJCK, POELL & DE WAAL, supra note 117, at 23; see also Paul Langley &
Andrew Leyshon, Platform Capitalism: The Intermediation and Capitalisation of Digital
Economic Circulation, 3 FIN. & SOC’Y 11, 25–26 (2017). See generally NICK SRNICEK,
PLATFORM CAPITALISM (2016).
190. See Vision, supra note 131, at 18.
191. Id. at 114.
192. Id. at 52–53.
193. Id. at 119.
194. Id. at 124.
195. Matthew Claudel, Tomorrow Belongs to Everybody!, SITE MAG. (Nov. 26, 2018),
http://www.thesitemagazine.com/read/tomorrow-belongs-to-everybody
[https://perma.cc/
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Whatever can be counted can be turned into data to facilitate exchanges and
to justify total oversight of the expenditure of time. Sidewalk imagines
Toronto’s future waterfront as a place that has eliminated “the divide between
home, work, and play.”196 As sensors fill the home and cover the body,
market logic may penetrate into the crevices and core of private life. It is one
thing to pay a trash disposal fee. But the conversion of all relationships (even
if just to things) to an infinite set of use-based, chargeable events means that
every interaction is monitored, measured, and marketized.197 When nothing
is owned but only leased on a fractional, per-use basis,198 gone is the freedom
and tolerance to gift or to over- and underuse,199 to avoid near-perfect price
discrimination,200 or to have a reasonably exercisable “freedom to be off”—
to be “free from systemic, environmentally architected human
engineering.”201
This kind of “just-in-time” resource allocation will have a particular cast.
It will be very responsive to inputs that are easily measured, to demands
easily expressed in real time, and to desires that can be monetized. However,
some data that should be used as an input will not be counted in part because
the people or places are not instrumented. Shannon Mattern asks in
connection with another smart city project, “[w]hat about all those potential
behaviors that are never enacted, and thus never measured, because the
physical space or its regulation prohibits them—or because one’s subjectivity
proscribes a repertoire of possible behaviors?”202 The existence of data
divides203—people whose data are not counted—will inflect datafication
with inequality.
X3NM-NVZS]. See generally Adam Arvidsson, Facebook and Finance: On the Social Logic
of the Derivative, 33 THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y 3 (2016); Jathan Sadowski, When Data Is
Capital: Datafication, Accumulation, and Extraction, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2019, at
1.
196. See Vision, supra note 131, at 54.
197. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE
FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019); Jennifer Cobbe & John
Morison, Understanding the Smart City: Framing the Challenges for Law and Good
Governance (June 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326489 [https://perma.cc/28RL-3UGC].
198. Sidewalk Labs, Sidewalk Talk: Idea Tour—Eric Baczuk, YOUTUBE (Dec. 22, 2016),
https://youtu.be/ZtbSMiKf4WM [https://perma.cc/XC3Q-YNMT]. After referring to the
quote that “housing is where jobs go to sleep at night” as a “nice way of thinking of it,” Baczuk
describes Google research aimed at making “living in a tiny place extraordinary and
desirable. . . . We’re really thinking of the home as a device as opposed to as a structure.” Id.
Baczuk presents slides that demonstrate home features including facial recognition, smart
toilets, floor-integrated scales, sleep scenes, and wireless vitals. Id.
199. See generally AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP:
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016).
200. ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND
PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 101–16 (2016).
201. BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 124 (2018).
202. See Mattern, supra note 24.
203. See Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 58–60
(2013); Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data; Why the Rise of Machines Isn’t All It’s
Cracked Up To Be, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 10, 2013, 12:40 AM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/10/think-again-big-data/ [https://perma.cc/3FPN-BFNA];
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The efficiency gains to be extracted from “radical” mixed-use may be
radically offset in other ways. First, the reliance on real-time and constant
data flows, data management, and computationally intensive infrastructure is
clearly not costless in terms of energy.204 Reliability and maintenance
impose other costs.205 And the impact is not only material—in a state of total
digital dependence, internet connectivity as well as hardware and software
maintenance becomes more than an annoyance and a forbearance; it becomes
critical to life quality and sustenance. Second, there are the practical
implications of mixed-use and sharing, which reflect in many ways the
realities that motivate private ownership and responsibility arrangements.
Whole new systems and structures, likely onerous in surveillance and
enforcement capacity, are required to manage, clean, maintain, and secure
the spaces and things that are subject to radical sharing practices,206 which
create attendant and novel challenges.207
D. Domination
Ben Green writes that the “architecture of the smart city is a fundamentally
undemocratic one” because the technologies “create massive information and
power asymmetries that favor governments and companies over those they
track and analyze, breeding impotence and subjugation.”208
The
privatization and platformization risks we discuss above can be sources of
subjugation for the individual and the collective. Here, we address how an
ambitious smart city project like Sidewalk Toronto can neuter the city’s
sovereign powers, using the examples of domination through rights-of-way
and tech interfaces.
The risks of domination are much higher when the smart city architect is
as dominant in data as Alphabet and its principal moneymaker, Google.209

see also Daniel Castro, The Rise of Data Poverty in America, CTR. ON DATA INNOVATION
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://www2.datainnovation.org/2014-data-poverty.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LDE3-BT4A].
204. See Anders S. G. Andrae & Tomas Edler, On Global Electricity Usage of
Communication Technology: Trends to 2030, 6 CHALLENGES 117, 118–19 (2015).
205. See Shapiro, supra note 23, at 72.
206. See, e.g., Patrick M. Bösch et al., Cost-Based Analysis of Autonomous Mobility
Services, 64 TRANSPORT POL’Y 76, 85–86 (2018) (“[E]ven with low cleaning frequencies and
costs, cleaning is the single largest contribution to the operating cost of autonomous
(individual) taxi schemes. . . . [D]eveloping viable business models for shared AV fleets will
entail solutions to require that customers behave appropriately while on board (e.g. video
observation of passengers, or a confirmation check by the next user on the condition of the car
to identify irresponsible passengers).”).
207. Division responses to shared space that currently are evenly shared (e.g., between
roommates on household bills) become difficult to maintain in scenarios of hypervisible and
individualized data collection.
208. BEN GREEN, THE SMART ENOUGH CITY: PUTTING TECHNOLOGY IN ITS PLACE TO
RECLAIM OUR URBAN FUTURE 92 (2019).
209. Joe Shaw & Mark Graham, An Informational Right to the City?: Code, Content,
Control, and the Urbanization of Information, 49 ANTIPODE 907, 912 (2017) (“[I]t is Google
that now occupies a type of informational right to the city, and it will be Google that can
increasingly control a city’s surplus production or best further their own vision and ideology
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Its ability to sink patient capital into infrastructure and other loss leaders
allows it to wait out potential competitors, leverage the network effects of
affiliated services, and close off opportunities for citizens or cities to opt out
of emerging technology systems. Sidewalk Toronto generates “techlash,”
the remonstrance against the power of big tech, primarily because it is an
Alphabet-Google project.210 Indeed, Sidewalk Toronto is a perfect storm for
techlash, involving as it does issues of data governance, surveillance,
efficiency optimization, information asymmetries, privatization, and hidden
agendas. The project feeds anxiety over domination by large, unaccountable
big data systems and the asymmetric knowledge they produce.
1. Rights-of-Way
The right-of-way is a precious “natural” urban resource. We do not here
rely on the fine points of Canadian law regarding cities’ proprietary interests
in these rights-of-way but rather on the general legal principle derived from
Roman law that cities manage public ways (owning them in fee or as
easements) for the benefit of the community.211 It is a principle recognized
by Canadian courts212 alongside American ones.213 Smart city developers
require access to public streets, sidewalks, underground and overhead
conduits, and pole installations to support platform services and underlying
connectivity. If a developer can dominate the city’s right-of-way and
franchising or licensing process, it can in effect plunder this resource and
subvert the public trust.
Sidewalk imagines the digital layer as a great public infrastructure project
in the tradition of the aqueducts of Rome, the London Underground, and the
street grid of Manhattan.214 The city’s role and the public’s stake in this
infrastructure is not clear, as discussed above. The passive voice
of how it might develop.”). See generally SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF
EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY) (2011).
210. The word was coined in 2013 by the Economist and shortlisted by Oxford Dictionaries
in 2018 as a “word of the year.” Word of the Year 2018: Shortlist, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/shortlist-2018 [https://perma.cc/GD5QGSFX] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (defining “techlash” as “[a] strong and widespread negative
reaction to the growing power and influence of large technology companies, particularly those
based in Silicon Valley”).
211. See 3 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 1310 (1912). According to a well-established principle, said to be derived from Roman law,
“[t]he title to streets and public ways whether in the people or a municipality, or in fee or in
easement, is held in trust for the public use.” Id. § 1307; Frederick E. Ellrod III & Nicholas P.
Miller, Property Rights, Federalism, and the Public Rights-of-Way, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
475, 483 (2003).
212. See, e.g., City of Vancouver v. Burchill, [1932] S.C.R. 620, 625 (Can.)
(“[M]unicipalities are in a sense owners of the streets” and hold them “as trustee for the
public.”).
213. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (The Court held
that streets “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”).
214. See Vision, supra note 131, at 17.
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predominates. There will be a “key investment . . . to create a system of
utility channels to accommodate all networked utilities . . . [to] provide space
for electric wires, telecom conduits, and water and district heating pipes, as
well as space for small-scale robots to travel between building basements and
under walkable streets.”215 Questions abound about whose investment this
will be (Sidewalk likes to speak of “catalyzing the financing” of such a
project, with an expectation of a “reasonable” return),216 the role of Googleaffiliated companies, and control of the utility channel. Then there is the
question of how those “utility” companies will interact with urban rights-ofway.
Some cautions emerge from another experimental Google project in North
America. Google Fiber, now under the umbrella of Alphabet’s Access
division, is, like Sidewalk, one of the Google-Alphabet empire’s “big bets.”
This means it is a company with the patient capital to test and scale a
technology without having to be financially successful. In 2010, Google
Fiber announced, with its signature primary color cheer, a competition that
sent American cities scrambling.217 It would lay gigabit fiber in some
number of lucky cities. Like Sidewalk, Google Fiber offered cities the
prospect of innovative services and plaudits. There were similar appeals to
the prosocial advantages of the technology rollout. City managers were
invited to “imagine sitting in a rural health clinic, streaming threedimensional medical imaging over the web . . . [o]r collaborating with
classmates around the world while watching live 3-D video of a university
lecture.”218 There were also promises to advance what was the progressive
tech policy agenda du jour: net neutrality. Google Fiber promised it would
build an “‘open access’ network . . . [operated] in an open, nondiscriminatory and transparent way.”219 As with Sidewalk Toronto, there
was no clear revenue model.220 As some fear will happen with Sidewalk
Toronto, Google Fiber’s public-minded language about building a utility
faded into the reality of a consumer product offered to the rich.221
215. Id. at 23.
216. See Media Events, supra note 30 (emphasis added); see also Daniel Doctoroff,
Opinion, Sidewalk Labs: ‘We Shouldn’t Be the Developer of the Eastern Waterfront,’ STAR
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2019/02/19/sidewalk-labs-wewerent-trying-to-do-anything-in-secret.html [https://perma.cc/WP2P-8TRY] (Seeking to
appease the public after a leak of plans, this “reasonable” return became a “negotiated
return.”).
217. Think Big with a Gig: Our Experimental Fiber Network, GOOGLE: OFFICIAL BLOG
(Feb.
10,
2010),
https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/think-big-with-gig-ourexperimental.html [https://perma.cc/SWK4-K2P9].
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Susan Crawford, Google Fiber Was Doomed from the Start, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2017,
12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/google-fiber-was-doomed-from-the-start/
[https://perma.cc/ZC84-ZT78] (stating that Google “wanted an unrealistic rate of return on
basic infrastructure” and lost patience, moving from characterizing its project as “an
‘experiment’ (2010), then a ‘business’ (2012), and finally a ‘bet’ or ‘moonshot’ (2015)”).
221. Id. (“The company inadvertently made plain the problem of treating internet access
like any other demand-prompted product, when its Kansas City installations failed to cross

492

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

Cities jumped to attract Google Fiber to their streets. They would clear
impediments to their rights-of-way222 in return for better broadband and open
networks. More than 1000 cities made their offers, preening like hopeful
suitors.223 Topeka even renamed itself “Google, Kansas”224 but was outdone
Google entered into a
by neighboring Kansas City, Missouri.225
development agreement with Kansas City in 2011.226 The city let Google
choose where to deploy, so long as the company made the service available
to “economically distressed” communities. In return, the city supplied
“assets and infrastructure” at no charge.227 It also promised to allow Google
employees to set up shop in city offices and to deploy dedicated municipal
personnel to work with Google.228 While the agreement did not commit
Google to offer an open platform, the company had represented that it would,
in keeping with its public positions in favor of net neutrality.229

into historically redlined parts of the city. A utility serving everyone fairly doesn’t ask for
payment and interest up front.”).
222. Google Fiber City Checklist, GOOGLE 5 (Feb. 2014), https://fiber.storage.
googleapis.com/legal/googlefibercitychecklist2-24-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG4V-HJ5U].
223. Henry Blodget, Google: 1,100 Cities Want Us to Build Them Huge Fiber Networks,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 28, 2010, 9:14 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/henry-blodgetgoogle-1100-cities-want-us-to-build-them-huge-fiber-networks-2010-3
[https://perma.cc/
PE7F-RUQQ].
224. John D. Sutter, Topeka ‘Renames’ Itself ‘Google, Kansas,’ CNN (Mar. 2, 2010, 4:14
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/03/02/google.kansas.topeka/index.html [https://
perma.cc/6UYR-69F3].
225. Ultra High-Speed Broadband Is Coming to Kansas City, Kansas, GOOGLE: OFFICIAL
BLOG (Mar. 30, 2011), https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/ultra-high-speedbroadband-is-coming-to.html [https://perma.cc/GU93-32GM] (announcing that Google Fiber
was coming to Kansas City, Kansas and quoting a Google executive: “[i]n selecting a city,
our goal was to find a location where we could build efficiently, make an impact on the
community and develop relationships with local government and community organizations”);
see also Everything’s Up to Date in Kansas City, GOOGLE FIBER (May 17, 2011),
https://fiber.google.com/blog/2011/everythings-up-to-date-in-kansas-city/
[https://perma.cc/2UJB-69UD] (announcing that Google Fiber was coming to Kansas City,
Missouri).
226. Development
Agreement,
NETCOMPETITON
(May
10,
2011),
http://www.netcompetition.org/wp-content/uploads/Google-Kansas-Agreement1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N936-25LY] (a development agreement between the Kansas City, Missouri
and Google Fiber Missouri, Inc.).
227. Id. at 4 (“City will provide Google with access to assets and infrastructure of City, to
the extent such assets or infrastructure are available and are needed for Google’s deployment
of the fiber network. . . . City will not impose any charges for access to or use of any City
facilities provided under this Agreement, nor will it impose any permit and inspection fees.”).
228. Id. at 5 (City will create a “team dedicated to the Project and allow Google to place
Project employees in City office locations, working side-by-side with the dedicated City
team.”).
229. See, e.g., Google Inc., Comments Regarding the FCC’s National Broadband Plan
(June 8, 2009), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/6520219958.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WFX-6BMG].
But see Sarah Nathan, 1934–2010: The Road to the Google-Verizon Proclamation, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 10, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/08/1934-2010-theroad-to-the-google-verizon-proclamation/61244/ [https://perma.cc/S92B-E7VB] (discussing
the 2010 “Verizon-Google Legislative Framework Proposal” that was presented as a
compromise on net neutrality and was widely seen as Google’s walk-back from its prior
position).
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Google executives “employed the construction of the railroads in the
1800s as a metaphor for the growth, innovation and transformation that
Google Fiber would provide” to residents.230 These benefits, they promised,
would extend to low-income communities. As it turned out, a demand-based
model meant that only the wealthier neighborhoods signed up in sufficient
numbers for the service. While nominally making the service available to
underserved communities, Google in fact did not deploy the service where
consumer “demand” lagged.231 Nor did it retain its commitment to the most
robust expression of net neutrality principles.232 The analogy to railroad
rights-of-way may have been more apt than Google realized. To be sure,
railroads spurred economic dynamism. They also used these gains to seize
territorial and financial concessions from government.233 In the end, Kansas
City did get better broadband but not all that was promised. Its local paper
editorialized ruefully: “Google Fiber hasn’t changed the world, or even this
part of it. That will be worth remembering the next time an amazing
technology emerges from Silicon Valley.”234
Another Google Fiber city, Louisville, Kentucky, traveled a different
trajectory.
There, Google started experimenting in 2017 with a
“nanotrenching” technology to see if it could cut the capital expenses of
building out expensive fiber infrastructure.235 Louisville allowed the
company to dig shallow trenches that barely buried the fiber. The city was
so committed to the success of this new entry that it even litigated on
Google’s behalf against incumbent broadband providers to gain access for

230. Germaine Halegoua, Calling All ‘Fiberhoods’: Google Fiber and the Politics of
Visibility, 18 INT’L J. CULTURAL STUD. 311, 313 (2015).
231. Id. at 313–14.
232. Ryan Singel, Now That It’s in the Broadband Game, Google Flip-Flops on Network
Neutrality, WIRED (July 30, 2013, 1:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/2013/07/googleneutrality/ [https://perma.cc/CD2B-S7HR] (describing the company’s response to an FCC
complaint concerning Google Fiber’s prohibition of customers’ attaching “servers” to their
gigabit service as violating net neutrality’s right-to-attach principles).
233. See, e.g., Ingrid Burrington, How Railroad History Shaped Internet History,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/howrailroad-history-shaped-internet-history/417414/ [https://perma.cc/3DJE-K4KK] (“The
history of American networks has always been the history of spooks, graft, questionable labor
and supply chains, and territorial conquest . . . [subsidized by government out of] a zealous,
romantic vision of the both liberatory and unifying potential of being able to traverse or defy
the limits of greater and greater distances.”).
234. Editorial, Google Fiber Has Changed Kansas City but Hasn’t Transformed It, KAN.
CITY STAR (Sept. 24, 2017, 8:30 PM), https://www.kansascity.com/opinion/
editorials/article174936081.html [https://perma.cc/N3NV-569Q].
See generally Burcu
Baykurt, The City as Data Machine: Local Governance in the Age of Big Data (May 17,
2019) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with authors) (using
Google Fiber in Kansas City as a case study of how a city convinces itself that digital
technologies can help it can achieve economic growth and progress).
235. Conner Forrest, Google Fiber Is Using a Secret Weapon to Outpace AT&T and Other
Gigabit Competitors, TECHREPUBLIC (Oct. 20, 2017, 5:57 AM), https://
www.techrepublic.com/article/google-fiber-is-using-a-secret-weapon-to-outpace-at-t-andother-gigabit-competitors/ [https://perma.cc/G3MW-BC94].
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Google to their utility poles.236 Google’s experiment ended in 2019 when it
decided to leave the city—and left cracked streets and exposed conduits in
its wake.237 After public outcry, it agreed to pay the city to repair the
streets.238
What the Google Fiber experience shows is not that patient capital invested
in fiber left the cities worse off than they were before (although in Louisville,
it might have). It is that the investment lured the cities into precarity by
giving up rights-of-way without the means to control the franchisee. Should
Google Fiber have become dominant and leveraged that infrastructure to
control data, wireless connectivity, and other elements of the digital layer,
the cities could have not leaned on their rights-of-way to counter the
dominance.
2. Application Interface
While land is the most tangible public resource in the Toronto smart city
deployment, there is also virtual infrastructure to consider. Data is
infrastructural and control over data is of central concern, as discussed above.
In other cities, the application programming interface (API) is another piece
of the digital infrastructure, control over which becomes an important piece
of sovereignty.239 Sidewalk imagines for the Toronto waterfront an API that
it would furnish to manage data access rights in the digital layer. The API
would provide for “regulated access to city data and the ability to interact
with the city infrastructure in ways that are safe and consistent with other
uses.”240 Sidewalk asserts that the API would be governed “by open
standards” and support use by “third-party developers.”241 In other words,
the API is Android for the city.242

236. See generally BellSouth Telecomms., LLC v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t,
275 F. Supp. 3d 833 (W.D. Ky. 2017) (holding that Louisville has the authority to regulate
pole attachments).
237. Paige Leskin, Google Fiber Is Shutting Down Its Super-High Speed Internet Service
in Louisville After Residents Complained That It Left Exposed Cables in the Streets, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 8, 2019, 8:22 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/google-fiberlouisville-shutdown-2019-2 [https://perma.cc/PBV2-NC3R].
238. City, Google Fiber Reach Agreement Providing for Restoration of Infrastructure
Affected by Google Fiber Construction, LOUISVILLEKY.GOV (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://louisvilleky.gov/news/city-google-fiber-reach-agreement-providing-restorationinfrastructure-affected-google-fiber [https://perma.cc/7XY8-527G] (“Google Fiber will pay
$3.84 million to Louisville Metro Government (LMG) to restore roads and other public rightsof-way affected by its departing service in Louisville.”).
239. Los Angeles, for example, has created its own open API for mobility applications
through which ride-sharing and other mobility services must share data with the city. Mobility
Data Specification, LADOT (Oct. 31, 2018), https://ladot.io/wp-content/uploads/2018/
12/What-is-MDS-Cities.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6WR-FU8C].
240. See Vision, supra note 131, at 70.
241. There is ambiguity as to how open the standards will be. Id. at 33 (“Platform
components and applications will be published under open-source licenses where doing so
results in significant additional value to the ecosystem as a whole.”).
242. Id. at 70 (“In much the same way that software platforms like Apple’s App Store, the
Google Play Store, and Amazon Web Services have stimulated creativity on the web and in
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The two things to note about this technological arrangement are that
“open” does not mean egalitarian and that “third parties” include city
managers. An API owner has the final say over API use. It can withdraw
access to applications that seek to connect or it can boost its own applications
over those of its competitors, as Google has done.243 The digital layer,
Android-esque ecosystem will seem “open.” But the initial and ongoing
design choices will be Sidewalk’s or whoever designs it.244 As Ariel Ezrachi
and Maurice Stucke write in relation to the experience with Android, Google
is a “super-platform” that “can degrade the functionality of independent apps
and online platforms . . . by reducing their performance and making them run
slower . . . foreclose[ing] . . . timely access to critical data; [or] . . .
preventing [them] from achieving the minimum efficient scale,” as well as
by making it “harder for consumers to find” independent apps or giving
“preferential treatment to its own or other competitive services.”245 Using
the metaphor of the savanna, they describe the dominant mode of cooperation
between super-platforms, platforms, and apps in capturing user data: “They
all benefit from the combined effort. But they do not share equally the spoils;
the dominant lion gets the best cut, which further enhances its power.”246
Similarly, on the waterfront, Sidewalk presumably could withdraw access
from or condition access to the digital layer’s API. Applied to the city, API
terms would influence regulatory authority. Applied to third parties, they
would influence competition. For example, Sidewalk proposes to make
curbside usage for parking, stopping, dining, building, or recreation available
through the API. One might have thought that collecting and providing
access to this data would be a quintessentially public function. But Sidewalk
proposes its own “Coord” platform for this purpose.247 The data run through
personal devices, the digital layer provides a set of APIs, with documentation and developer
support that will inspire the same creativity in the city.”).
243. See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google
€1.49 Billion for Abusive Practices in Online Advertising (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1770_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/T5KK-JA8X];
Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion for
Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s
Search Engine (July 18, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/4B9X-2SQA]; see also Konstantinos Stylianou, Exclusion in Digital
Markets, 24 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 181, 246 (2018) (“Rivals have complained
that the tying of Android with Google’s applications, and the bundling of Google’s
applications together, creates an unfair competitive advantage for Google, which in turn makes
competition on the merits harder or impossible for them.”).
244. Christoph Raetzsch et al., Weaving Seams with Data: Conceptualizing City APIs as
Elements of Infrastructures, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, Jan.–June 2019, at 1, 4 (“Because such APIs
provide indispensable data for serving the visible layer of the user interface, they begin to
assume infrastructural functions for navigating urban spaces although their governance and
design is not subject to public scrutiny or even awareness.”).
245. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 200, at 156–57; see also id. at 178–90 (explaining
in detail the unilateral removal of a privacy-preserving app, Disconnect, from the Google Play
Store).
246. Id. at 170.
247. Stephen Smyth, Announcing Coord: The Integration Platform for Mobility Providers,
Navigation Tools, and Urban Infrastructure, SIDEWALK LABS (Feb. 1, 2018),
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this platform and API would likely include personal information like license
plates (to automatically regulate and enforce traffic laws), as well as deidentified data for usage or vehicle type.248 In order to get at this data, and
therefore enforce parking laws or grant special usage permits, the city would
have to go through the API. The city, in other words, stands in the shoes of
any other third party, subject to the choices of the API’s owner.
Through the API deployed in Toronto’s waterfront, not only will the
government access the necessary data to serve citizens but citizens will
access government services.249 The digital dependency discussed above
comes to be a dependency on the very same tech interface that the city too
requires. Citizen and city are bound together, not directly, but through
mutual dependency on the same interfaces. This is the case, for example,
when cities use Facebook as the principal communications forum with their
residents.250 The application provider’s terms of service, interconnection
with other services, and technical affordances then constitute a form of urban
control the city cannot easily resist.
Techniques to avoid domination by API need to be developed and built
into systems of urban governance, whether these are contractual obligations,
regulations, or simply alternatives.
CONCLUSION
In its first eighteen months of existence, the Sidewalk Toronto project did
not stray from Sidewalk’s original vision, notwithstanding pointed and wellpublicized public critique and revelations by a handful of admirably
aggressive local journalists. The vision has only consolidated, along with the
collaboration between Sidewalk and WT, which presented a totally unified
approach. Most significantly for our purposes, despite the volume of interest
and intensity of concern regarding the venture, no aspect of Sidewalk’s
proposed vision for governance—and, in particular, no substantive aspect of
data extraction, privatization, platformization, or monopolization—was aired
for substantial challenge, refinement, or rescindment. Instead, there was an
elaborate, performative, and painfully drip-fed process of public

https://www.sidewalklabs.com/blog/announcing-coord-the-integration-platform-formobility-providers-navigation-tools-and-urban-infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/JXJ2-DL9F].
248. See Digital Strategy Advisory Panel Technology Update, supra note 174, at 13–29;
Welcome—Roundtable4: Plenary Session, WATERFRONT TORONTO (Dec. 8, 2018), https://
storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/13210436/
online_RT4_PLENARY-Session.pdf [https://perma.cc/B47L-NVQQ].
249. See Vision, supra note 131, at 18 (explaining that each resident will be given “a highly
secure, personalized portal through which residents can access public and private services”).
250. City dependency on commercial social media platforms is part of what renders them
basic utilities. See K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social
Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1670
(2018) (“Google and Facebook are increasingly part of our informational infrastructure,
shaping the distribution of and access to news, ideas, and information upon which our
economy, culture, and increasingly politics depend on.”).
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engagement,251 involving delayed information releases and staged
consultations on already or nearly consummated agreements.
The net effect is that while Sidewalk’s first-rate campaign to romance the
city did not entirely succeed in its first stages, the project acquired global
renown and a sense of inevitability, aided by a combination of lavishly
funded publicity and coquettish mystery. The release of the MIDP at the end
of the period studied was another flashy and well-orchestrated set piece, and
Sidewalk has continued as of this writing to wear any critique as “incredibly
robust dialogue” that helps the firm to improve.252 The success of this
strategy going forward is far from given, as Sidewalk’s tactics have hardened
and tutored resistance to the project, leading to a growing grassroots
#BlockSidewalk campaign, threats of legal action, and at least some
indicators of more rigorous oversight from public officials.253
As demonstrated in Part I, the process failures in the rollout of Sidewalk
Toronto have been ample. When combined with the substantive concerns set
forth in Part II, they propose to dramatically change the structure of urban
life and threaten public governance. To recap the threats to governance
demonstrated by Sidewalk’s original vision and evidenced through the first
eighteen months of the project:
(1) City planning and data management were referred to a private company
that kept the public and public officials always one step or more behind the
action.
(2) Notwithstanding stated deference to public bodies, the project’s
foundational provisions on intellectual property, data, and procurement,
along with the basic blueprint, fundamentally disempower the public and
serve the interests of the private company.
(3) In the city as platform model, public administration is a mere app at the
edge of centralized infrastructure owned and operated by a private company.
(4) Regulation, lawmaking, and enforcement may be substantially taken
over by the private company, which envisages a system of data-driven,
outcome-based code that is highly personalized and dependent on a constant
process of data extraction.
(5) Through platformization and the accompanying logic of efficiency and
datafication, previously fixed and static assets are reconceived as “just-intime updatable devices,” subject to data-enabled, single-use transactions.

251. See Rob Kitchin, The Ethics of Smart Cities, RTÉ (Apr. 27, 2019),
https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2019/0425/1045602-the-ethics-of-smart-cities/
[https://perma.cc/J8YE-U6TD]; see also Shannon Mattern, Sidewalk Labs’s Material CoDesign, WORDS SPACE (Apr. 28, 2019), http://wordsinspace.net/shannon/2019/04/28/
sidewalk-labss-material-co-design/ [https://perma.cc/GQF3-GHEP].
252. See generally Media Events, supra note 30.
253. Amanda Coletta, Quayside, Toronto’s Google-Linked Smart City, Draws Opposition
over Privacy, Costs, WASH. POST (May 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/the_americas/quayside-torontos-google-linked-smart-city-draws-opposition-overprivacy-costs/2019/05/05/e0785500-6d12-11e9-bbe7-1c798fb80536_story.html
[https://perma.cc/TG63-3344].
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This logic encourages frictionless satiation of impulse, magnifies existing
inequalities, and undervalues human freedom and social cohesion.
(6) Google experiments in other cities and domains teach that cities that
readily hand over physical rights-of-way leave themselves servile to deeppocketed prospectors and that API control of data exchanges can augment
unchecked platform power and deepen irreversible datafication.
What emerges from these points and the prior analysis is not a grievance
with technology nor with urban innovation per se. It is with privatization,
platformization, and domination. It is with the centrality and hugely
asymmetric power of a private corporate group—Alphabet-Google, through
its affiliate Sidewalk—and the control it is able to exercise over nearly every
aspect of the future district.
Before the project reached this point, there might have been reasonable
steps that Toronto, in conjunction with WT, could have taken to mitigate
these concerns. These might have included a requirement of impact
assessments on every proposed service in the project; of independent review
for each service; that Sidewalk pilot innovations at Quayside or Google
facilities before broader deployment; that the city itself administer any data
trust functionality and approve data collection in a cautionary, stepwise
manner based on evidence and necessity; that the relevant governmental
process conclude its own data governance rulemaking; that any intellectual
property provision properly assess the value the public is bringing and ensure
a reasonable return; and that ordinary procurement procedures apply at all
stages of the redevelopment.
After so much secrecy and legerdemain, these policy interventions may be
too late if they leave the project’s essential blueprint in place. Course
corrections that are too timid and implicitly endorse and embed deep
structural compromises into the heart of urban governance will drain the city
of power. The alternative, for Toronto and others, is to pursue urban
innovation with private partners but only in a way that rejects a central role
for any one company—and certainly any role of “co-master developer.”
What Sidewalk has provided is a vision where its own upper hand in platform
control, data governance, intellectual property, procurement, and access has
at each turn an obvious and legitimate alternative: the hand of the city itself.

